

Food Crisis in the Sahel

Five steps to break the hunger cycle in 2012



‘The question is not whether there will be another food "crisis" in the Sahel in 2012, but to what extent’ – EU Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva

Summary

Ever since the first warnings of drought and poor harvests in Africa’s Sahel region emerged in late 2011, vulnerable communities in many areas of the region have been threatened by a looming food crisis. That crisis is now real, and 15 million people in seven countries are vulnerable to its impact. Food stocks have already run out for some communities, and are running dangerously low for others. Support to protect lives and livelihoods is urgently needed before the crisis becomes an emergency.

This briefing calls for urgent action to face up to five major challenges, built on a thorough analysis of the current situation in the Sahel and learning from the experience of previous crises in this region, as well as the recent catastrophic food crisis in the Horn of Africa, from which we know that the biggest risk is to wait.

Oxfam, ROPPA and RBM call on donors, governments in the region, regional bodies, NGOs and UN agencies to:

- Close the funding gap now, to ensure programmes are in place before the crisis hits its peak;
- Ensure the right assistance targets the most vulnerable people, including those affected by conflict;
- Keep regional markets open to keep food flowing and prices down;
- Strengthen leadership and coordination to ensure an effective response;
- Invest in the long term to build resilience and break the hunger cycle.

2012 can be different. If we act now, there is still time to protect many communities from the worst impacts of the food crisis. And by investing in the long term we can finally break the hunger cycle in the Sahel.

The Sahel in 2010: Long-term vulnerabilities exposed by poor harvests and high food prices

The causes of food crises in the Sahel are both long-term and short-term and require an understanding of why 300,000 children of this region die of malnutrition, even in a ‘non-crisis’ year. Cycles of drought combined with low levels of agricultural investment, environmental degradation, high population growth and acute levels of poverty contribute to a context of structural, chronic vulnerability. In this situation, even moderate external shocks can have major impacts,¹ while the recurrent nature of crises over the last ten years has meant that millions of people have not been able to recover assets in between shocks.

The region’s vulnerability has been laid bare yet again by low and uneven rainfall combined with attacks on crops by birds, pests and locusts. Cereal production across the Sahel in autumn 2011 was 25 per cent lower than in 2010, creating a gross deficit of 2.7m tonnes. Some areas have fared worse, with production in The Gambia and Chad down over 50 per cent compared with 2010.²

Food prices are also dangerously high. In comparison with the five-year average, prices in December 2011 were 30–40 per cent higher in Niger and Chad, 50–60 per cent higher in Mali and Burkina Faso, and in some areas such as in northern Mali prices were up to 90 per cent higher.³ Trends for February and March 2012 show few indications of reductions in prices, except in a few instances. Given that 60 per cent of people in the Sahel buy their food in the market, and that food accounts for 80 per cent of the expenditure of the most vulnerable groups, this

matters greatly. Many families are also no longer able to rely so much on alternative sources of income – a reduction in remittances from migrant workers previously sending money back from Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, for example, has added further pressures on vulnerable families.

And while some coastal countries neighbouring the Sahel have produced more favourable harvests, there are unfortunately many doubts that the regional food market will be able to transfer enough food effectively to deficit areas (see page 4). Further still, the growing insecurity and conflict in Mali, as well as northern Nigeria, risks further increasing humanitarian needs while limiting humanitarian access, as well increasing food prices, disrupting pastoralist migration routes and preventing people from migrating to search for employment and income.

The humanitarian impact: 15 million people vulnerable in 2012

Some communities already find themselves in crisis, others see crisis on the horizon as an early lean season approaches and the annual 'hunger gap' lengthens. Overall, the lives and livelihoods of 15.6 million people are vulnerable to the food crisis, while conflict in northern Mali has produced additional humanitarian needs through the displacement of more than 220,000 people since late January 2012.⁴ Those most likely to be affected include women, small livestock holders, poor households with limited access to productive means, households who used to rely on seasonal migration in conflict affected areas, and communities living in areas affected by insecurity.

The consequences are serious. According to an Oxfam survey in the Sahelian belt of Eastern Chad, for example, 63 per cent of households would be unable to cover their needs after February,⁵ while cereal stocks in eight of the 22 regions of Chad will on average have disappeared in March.⁶ There are already signs of extreme coping strategies, such as searching for grain in the earth that ants may have stored. In the Tillaberi region in western Niger, communities have seen their food stocks dwindle and their debts pile up, and many families are migrating to cities in search of food and jobs.

Table 1: People in the Sahel region vulnerable to food insecurity, March 2012

Country	Total numbers food insecure/in areas at risk⁷
Mauritania	700,000 food insecure, of which 290,000 severely
Mali	3,575,160 in communes at risk
Niger	6,112,089 food insecure, of which 1,916,855 severely
Burkina Faso	2,065,738 food insecure
Chad	3,622,200 food insecure, of which 1,180,300 severely
Senegal	850,000 food insecure
The Gambia	713,433 in areas at risk

Without major interventions, livelihoods will be depleted and assets reduced as animals die or are sold for food and seeds are eaten. Malnutrition rates will also rise significantly without preventive action. UNICEF estimates that more than one million children under five in the Sahel are threatened by severe acute malnutrition this year. This will have long-term effects on child development and the creation of sustainable livelihoods, further entrenching poverty in the region.

The response to date and challenges ahead

The response to date has in some important ways been more positive than in previous crises in the region: the early warning systems functioned relatively well; governments in the region raised the alarm quickly; and some donors mobilised funds more quickly than in previous crises. However, there remain huge gaps to fill and areas to strengthen quickly if the humanitarian response is effectively to meet the needs of the most vulnerable communities.

This briefing outlines five major challenges that need to be faced and overcome in order to protect 15 million people from this year's food crisis and from crises in the future. If money can be mobilised quickly, if assistance can target and reach the most vulnerable people, if regional markets can keep food flowing, if leadership and coordination can be strengthened, and if investments can be made to build resilience in the long term, we can save lives and livelihoods in 2012, and we can start to break the hunger cycle in the Sahel.

1 Close the funding gap now, before the crisis hits its peak

By investing now in earlier and more cost-effective actions, vulnerable populations can be better protected at a much lower cost than if action is delayed until the crisis hits. Preventing malnutrition is far cheaper than treating it; keeping animal herds alive is many times less expensive than replacing them.

In 2005, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator Jan Egeland estimated that it cost \$1 per day to protect a child from malnutrition before that year's food crisis in Niger, and \$80 per day to save a child's life from severe malnutrition by the time the crisis had reached its peak.⁸


It is encouraging, therefore, that some donors mobilised funding at an early stage, even if the overall response remained too low. For example, in late 2011 ECHO had already committed additional funding to the region in anticipation of the crisis, and increased its support to €123.5m in January 2012. A range of other donors have also since provided funds to support the early response.

However, at the beginning of April 2012 a major gap in funding remains, with a number of donors yet to contribute at all, and others who need to do more to provide a fair share of the resources required.⁹ In January 2012 the UN estimated that \$724.5m was needed to meet immediate needs, an estimate that will almost certainly rise substantially as needs are re-evaluated in early April and beyond. The World Food Programme (WFP) alone estimates its own financial needs to respond to this crisis as \$808m.¹⁰

As of 5 April, the UN Financial Tracking System (FTS) reports that \$354m of funding has so far been committed to the response,¹¹ although donors do appear to have made further pledges that have either yet to be allocated or to be recorded by the FTS. Rapid disbursement of these pledges would push up the real funding immediately available, allowing agencies to implement programmes when they can be most effective.

Committing and disbursing the funding as early as possible is as important as the amount itself. In the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis, for example, few funds were released until a full famine was declared, many months after the first warnings. Figure 1 shows how late funding was mobilised in relation to the first warnings, and how it was thus unable to halt the ever-rising rates of malnutrition that built up towards famine levels over many months.

Figure 1: Early warnings and inadequate response to the Horn of Africa drought 2010–11



The huge influx of aid that was eventually committed did help save many lives, but many more lives and livelihoods could have been protected at far less cost had this money been mobilised months earlier.¹² Similarly, in the 2010 Sahel food crisis, the USA authorised \$50m in food aid for Niger from the US domestic market, but it took three to five months to arrive and one-third had not yet arrived by August – far too late for many.¹³ April 2012 will be a key month for the scale-up of funds to this crisis, if they are to be translated into action on the ground *ahead* of the peak of the crisis.

Recommendations

- National governments and donors should immediately mobilise and speed up disbursement of sufficient funding to support national emergency response plans, in order to protect populations.
- A high-level pledging conference should be organised before the end of April 2012 to help mobilise funds, with each country expected to pay its fair share of outstanding needs. OCHA should play a leading role in organising the conference and in clearly establishing the scale of regional needs.

2 Ensure the right assistance targets the most vulnerable, including those affected by conflict

While actors must intervene with sufficient speed, scale and resource, there must also be a strong focus on targeting the people who most need help, including women, pastoralists and those affected by conflict.

Pastoral zones received too little support, too late in 2010, and the same mistake should not be repeated. In 2012, pastoralists are again among the most affected groups, with reduced pasture and water resources, as well as reduced availability and access to livestock food supplies. In addition declining terms of trade between animal and food prices have reduced their ability to buy food. It takes at least three years to rebuild a small stock of sheep and goats, and up to ten years to build up cattle stocks. Supporting pastoralist communities to keep animal herds alive will be many times less expensive than replacing them, and given that pastoralists are affected earlier than other groups, early action is particularly important.

The specific needs of vulnerable women also require attention. In the poorest families, men often migrate to seek employment in other regions or countries, leaving women and children behind. When the search for employment fails, wives and children may have to leave as well and use precarious and destructive coping mechanisms such as selling assets, begging in towns or even prostitution. In order to protect children from these shocks, and from malnutrition, it is crucial to specifically target women so that they can meet their needs, look after their children and build their economic opportunities.

The immediate need is to support access to essential food and non-food needs in order to prevent people selling their assets to buy food, in addition to ensuring access to safe water and promoting good hygiene practices at community level to reduce the risk of diarrhoeal diseases and malnutrition.

As the lean season begins to hit,¹⁴ there will be a need for increased food assistance, including through cash or vouchers where there is good availability and access to markets, and to ensure a good network of malnutrition treatment centres. Preparation to support productive activities is also crucial in advance of the first rains, expected before June, to help people recover. Producers need seeds, tools and food to be ready to start working in their fields, and pastoralists need to have maintained, vaccinated and de-wormed their animals in order for them to be fit enough for the start of the rainy season

It is important to provide assistance not only in areas of origins, or in areas of deficit, but also to meet the needs of those who have moved in search of income opportunities or food, or water and pasture for their animals, and who often gather in very precarious conditions.

Conflict in northern Mali has displaced more than 220,000 people since late January 2012.¹⁵ UNHCR has raised an appeal for \$93.8m,¹⁶ and the situation remains extremely unstable following the coup d'état of 22 March. Assessments show that displaced people have urgent humanitarian needs, while the movement of populations to already food-insecure zones risks aggravating the food insecurity for host families. Conflict has also already pushed prices up in regional food markets; caused a major movement of pastoralists to areas where water and fodder is already extremely low; and prevented people from migrating to search for alternative employment and income to support their families.

As insecurity increases, serious risks are also posed to the ability of humanitarian organisations to provide support to vulnerable communities in zones affected by conflict. Regions most directly affected by conflict are also among those directly affected by the food crisis, and ensuring humanitarian access to support these communities must be a key priority for all actors in Mali. There is also a significant danger that some sanctions proposed by ECOWAS, including the closure of borders and restrictions on access to finance, will hamper these efforts if applied for any protracted period.

Recommendations

- All actors should ensure that humanitarian interventions reach the most vulnerable people with the right assistance, including by ensuring adequate targeting of women and pastoralists and strengthening interventions focused on community-level water, sanitation and hygiene.
- All authorities in all parts of Mali, supported by OCHA where needed, should ensure that all populations affected by conflict are able to access humanitarian assistance. This includes meeting the needs of people displaced by conflict, those remaining in conflict zones, and the host communities.
- All national, regional and international actors should work towards a political solution that provides the peace and stability necessary to meet the needs of vulnerable populations. Sanctions that threaten the livelihoods of vulnerable communities, the provision of basic services and humanitarian assistance, the freedom of civilians to escape violence, or the functioning of regional food markets must not be imposed.

3 Keep markets open to keep food flowing and prices down

The efficient functioning of regional food markets are an essential element of transferring food at an affordable price from areas of surplus crop production, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Benin, to countries with crop deficits in the

Sahel. There are strong signs, however, that the market is not functioning well, with the strongest sign of market failure being the continued high and volatile level of food prices, which failed to come down as expected during the harvest period and which remain extremely high compared with the five-year average.

A number of factors are impacting on the ability of the regional market to function effectively. The scattered distribution of deficit areas in comparison with previous crises makes it more difficult for food to reach these zones; high prices in Sudan are diverting trade from areas of Chad; high industrial demand in Ghana is reducing the amounts available for exportation; and high fuel costs inflate prices further.

Insecurity is a major and growing concern. Fear of violence in northern Nigeria is deterring both traders and migrants from Chad and Niger, reducing both importations and opportunities for seasonal migration. Harassment and corruption is increasing food transport costs,¹⁷ while some border posts in Borno and Yobe states have been closed, and at other borders exports have been dramatically reduced. Insecurity in northern Mali has also disrupted the markets in conflict-affected areas; increasing prices in most large regional markets, a situation that could significantly worsen with any further deterioration of security.

Another significant risk is the introduction of legislative or administrative measures limiting the exportation of food. Burkina Faso has limited the exportation of cereals since December 2011, a measure complicating the importation of food to severely food-insecure areas such as Tillabery in Niger, while also limiting the scope of WFP to purchase food for distribution across the region. In Mali, which also provides key exports to the region, permits for exportation of cereals must now be done on a case-by-case basis, increasing the costs of bringing food to deficit zones¹⁸.

These measures not only ignore the lessons of previous crises, where export limitations significantly pushed up food prices in neighbouring countries, but contravene the Charter on Food Crisis Prevention and Management, an inter-governmental agreement signed by 17 Ministers of Agriculture from ECOWAS, Mauritania and Chad in November 2011 that aimed to ensure regional coordination and solidarity in the functioning of markets.

Recommendations

- The ECOWAS region, plus Mauritania and Chad, should coordinate effectively to ensure the full functioning of regional markets and population flows, facilitating trade and ensuring that no country introduces restrictions that could impact on the food security of others.
- Burkina Faso and Mali should remove recently introduced administrative measures limiting exports.

4 Strengthen leadership and coordination to ensure an effective response

Leadership and coordination are essential to the effective management of all stages of the response to food crises, from early warning to relief, recovery, and challenging the structural causes. The evaluation of the 2010 response by the Sahel Working Group outlines major challenges in coordination, even in countries where there were recognised and agreed frameworks, leading to a lack of information, delays in responses, duplication of efforts and unequal concentration of resources.¹⁹

The role both of governments and UN agencies are crucial. Although exact roles depend on the context and the level of state capacity, key principles include ensuring the deployment of experienced leadership; the development of national plans that have the wide support of the humanitarian community, donors and governments; support to national capacity to deliver effective coordination; and support to civil society to hold governments to account.

In the context of the Sahel, a key framework which must be applied is the Charter on Food Crisis Prevention and Management, an agreement signed by 17 Ministers of Agriculture from ECOWAS, Mauritania and Chad in November 2011. This includes key commitments on early warning systems, coordination and information structures, and the creation of 'an operational food crisis management strategy framework' in times of crisis, among much else. Oxfam, ROPPA and RBM will be working with other civil society organisations from April 2012 to monitor the application of the Charter and to identify areas to be strengthened.

Among governments in the region, there have been positive aspects of the response to date. One of the most significant has been the effective functioning of national early warning systems in most countries. Further, almost all of the most affected governments had recognised the crisis and asked for international assistance by the end of 2011. Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have long developed emergency response plans and budgets;²⁰ Burkina Faso has itself provided \$16m for cereal purchases and maize production; Chad has subsidised around 20,000 tonnes of cereals; Mali has bought 21,000 tonnes of maize and millet; and the Government of Mauritania has committed to finance 50 per cent of its national plan.

Among UN agencies too, there have been some positive signs, with all major agencies raising the alarm and beginning preparations before the end of 2011. There has also been an improvement in the quality of interventions by some agencies, in particular a greater consideration of cash-based responses when appropriate, particularly in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

Yet there also remain many significant areas to strengthen. Chad, Senegal and The Gambia have yet to agree fully operational national plans that are able to effectively coordinate and drive the response, while the implementation

of other plans has often been too slow. There is a need to reinforce coordination mechanisms at country level; to strengthen the food pipeline given the logistical challenges of bringing produce into the region; and an urgent need to provide greater clarity around financing needs and modalities to mobilise funding more effectively in support of national plans, modifying existing mechanisms where needed.

Recommendations

- All parties should fully apply the Charter on Food Crisis Prevention and Management. Critically, this should ensure that every country has developed a comprehensive and operational national emergency plan, with financial needs clearly outlined and communicated, in coordination with UN agencies, NGOs and civil society organisations.
- All actors should coordinate support around national plans; and interventions and coordination structures should seek to strengthen state capacity and leadership, as well as civil society's role in ensuring accountability.

5 Building resilience for the long-term to break the hunger cycle

Protecting communities from the current food crisis in the Sahel is crucial, but represents only part of the battle to exit the vicious cycle of crises in the region. As well as acting early and developing effective, targeted responses throughout the crisis, we need to act in the long term to reduce people's vulnerability and increase their resilience to recurrent crises.

There will undoubtedly be droughts again in the Sahel; the question is how well communities will be able to cope with them and how they are supported to do so. Whether the Sahel will remain in a cycle of under-investment, chronic vulnerability and late response to crises, or whether that cycle can be broken with more progressive and rational investments, is the challenge ahead.

In October 2011 the Sahel Working Group launched a report analysing the lessons learnt from the Sahel crises of 2005 and 2010, making specific and detailed recommendations focused on strengthening the resilience of populations and changing the approaches of humanitarian and development actors.²¹ It outlines a range of priority interventions, as well as encouraging a conceptual shift away from the false dichotomy of 'development' and 'humanitarian' in order to invest more in the 'grey zones' that will help to prevent emergencies in regions like the Sahel and to make development gains sustainable.

Practically speaking, responding more effectively to crises will require strengthening early preparedness by applying the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (Improved Harmonised Framework) in a timely and consultative way, and ensuring that actors react decisively to early warning systems. Yet it will also require a range of longer-term investments to reduce vulnerability and build resilience.

Firstly, with food often available on the market but inaccessible due to high prices, developing food reserves in vulnerable regions will be critical not only in enhancing access to affordable stocks in order to rapidly respond to future crises, but also to help governments prevent and manage food price volatility. ECOWAS recently committed to defining a regulatory framework for the development of a regional system of food reserves, a process that should be supported by donors, including at the G20 meeting in June 2012.

Secondly, national policies and programmes promoting social protection measures and social safety nets are needed for the most vulnerable people and communities, especially children, pregnant and breastfeeding women and the elderly. This will increase the long-term resilience of households, improve the nutrition of children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and lessen the impact of the future droughts. The meeting of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in Rome in October 2012 provides a key opportunity to promote and support these investments.

Thirdly, a change is needed to the system of producing and consuming food, moving away from a focus on investing in a limited range of export crops and towards investment in small-scale producers who can increase local food production and break the dependency on fragile and expensive international markets. Critically, this should include allocating at least 10 per cent of national budgets to agriculture, as promised in the 2003 African Union Maputo Declaration, and ensuring that this is focused on supporting small-scale food producers, especially women.

Recommendations

All actors should invest in longer-term interventions that reduce the chronic vulnerability of people in the region to future crises, including:

- Investment of at least 10 per cent of national budgets in agriculture, targeting small-scale food producers, especially women.
- The development of national, regional and community-based food reserves, including through support to the proposed ECOWAS framework at the G20 meeting in June 2012
- Greater investment in long term social protection and safety net programmes, and support for them at the CFS meeting in October 2012.

Notes

- ¹ Sahel Working Group, October 2011, *Escaping the Hunger Cycle: Pathways to Resilience in the Sahel* available at <http://bit.ly/w4Ew5P>
- ² Report of *Concertation Regionale sur la Situation Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest*, Abidjan, 13-15 March 2012. Cereal deficits compared to 2010 were reported as 56 per cent in The Gambia, 49 per cent in Chad, 36 per cent in Senegal, 31 per cent in Niger, and 20 per cent in Burkina Faso.
- ³ *Securite Alimentaire et Implications Humanitaires en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Sahel*, Note Conjointe FAO/WFP January 2012.
- ⁴ OCHA Sahel Humanitarian Snapshot, 29th March 2012
- ⁵ Oxfam, *Surveillance de la sécurité alimentaire, Zone de Gozbeida et Koukou Angarana*, Newsletter 5 Octobre- Décembre 2011
- ⁶ Enquête Nationale Post Récoltes sur la Sécurité Alimentaire des Ménages Ruraux du Tchad, Ministère de l'agriculture/PAM/FAO, Novembre-Décembre 2011.
- ⁷ All figures come from national Early Warning Systems. Figures for Senegal come from the FAO/WFP Joint Update, January 2012. Figures for Mali, Senegal and The Gambia represent the number of people living in affected communes, but not necessarily the number of individuals directly affected..
- ⁸ Mousseau, F. *Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation? A Case Study of the 2005 Food Crisis in Niger* p13.
- ⁹ A country's 'fair share' could be considered as being proportional to its national wealth. Further analysis is to be developed on this.
- ¹⁰ Both figures in IASC FSWNG '2012 Strategic Document, 2nd Version', February 2012. Available at <http://bit.ly/GWuZXa>.
- ¹¹ UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, <http://fts.unocha.org/>, checked 27th March 2012.
- ¹² A full evaluation of the international response to the Horn of Africa crisis can be found in a paper produced by Oxfam and Save the Children: *'Dangerous Delay: The Cost of Late Response to Early Warnings in the 2011 Drought in the Horn of Africa'*
- ¹³ Sahel Working Group, *Escaping the Hunger Cycle*
- ¹⁴ The earlier beginning of the lean season will vary across the region, but in general could now be expected for pastoralists in February/March and for agricultural communities in April/May. However, for some communities – for example in parts of Mauritania where food stocks are heavily depleted – this began as early as January.
- ¹⁵ OCHA Sahel Humanitarian Snapshot, 29th March 2012
- ¹⁶ UNHCR Emergency Response Appeal, February 2012, http://data.unhcr.org/MaliSituation/Current_Emergency_Response_Appeal.pdf
- ¹⁷ FEWSNET, 19 March 2012 http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/West_marketreport_2012_03_fr_final.pdf
- ¹⁸ *Securite Alimentaire et Implications Humanitaires en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Sahel*, Note Conjointe FAO/WFP January 2012.
- ¹⁹ Sahel Working Group: <http://bit.ly/w4Ew5P>
- ²⁰ The national plans of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are budgeted at \$156m, \$222m, \$322m and \$141m respectively.
- ²¹ 24 detailed recommendations are made in the report of the Sahel Working Group, *Escaping the Hunger Cycle: Pathways in the Sahel* available at <http://bit.ly/w4Ew5P>.

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Oxfam

Oxfam is an international confederation of fifteen organizations working together in 92 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice.

Oxfam is active in all the most affected countries of the Sahel, launching or scaling up programmes focussed on food security, livelihoods and access to safe water and good hygiene practices, to meet immediate needs as well as strengthen resilience. Oxfam aims to reach 1.2 million people with humanitarian assistance programmes in 2012.

Please write to any of the agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org

ROPPA

The network of Peasant organizations and Producers in West Africa (ROPPA) was officially founded on July 2000 during a meeting in Cotonou. The network gathers 13 nationals' farmer's organisations from West Africa and some associated members (Cap Verde and Nigeria).

As a strategic actor on food sovereignty issues, ROPPA's attention was quickly raised by the first signs of a food crisis in West Africa. This commitment has been demonstrated by efforts done in monitoring the situation as well as interacting with keys stakeholders and participating in forward thinking with regional partners on research tools for sustainable management of the structural causes of the crisis and its implications. ROPPA's advocacy work reaffirmed its original vision of "promoting the development of family farms and family farming while managing policies related to the liberalization of national economies and the globalization of trade.

www.roppa.info

Réseau Billital Maroobé

Réseau Bilital Maroobe (RBM) brings together associations of pastoralists and breeders from 7 West african countries, and plays a role in monitoring the situation of pastoralists in zones affected by the food crisis. In 2010, RBM conducted a study that highlighted the shortcomings of mechanisms to support strategies of pastoralist communities, while in October 2011 the network drew the attention of governments and donors to the impending food and pastoral crisis in the Sahel. RBM has been highlighting the impact of the current crisis on pastoralist and is currently engaged in action research on access to food and livestock in vulnerable pastoralist households.

www.maroobe.org