TURNING THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM ON ITS HEAD

Saving lives and livelihoods by strengthening local capacity and shifting leadership to local actors

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The global humanitarian system is overstretched, investing inadequately in risk reduction and prevention, and providing assistance that is often insufficient, inappropriate, and late. Humanitarian action led by governments in crisis-affected countries, assisted and held accountable by civil society, is usually faster and more appropriate, saving more lives and alleviating the suffering of many more men, women, and children. Yet, during 2007–2013, less than 2 percent of annual humanitarian assistance went directly to local actors. This system must change, with locally led humanitarian action whenever possible; adequate funding to state and non-state actors in affected countries; and stronger partnerships between international and local actors, focusing on strengthening local capacity.

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ACRONYMS

AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CAR	Central African Republic
CBHA	Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies
CEPREDENAC	Central American Integration System's Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	common humanitarian fund
CRGR	Concertación Regional de Gestión de Riesgos
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
DAC CRS	DAC Credit Reporting System
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DI	Development Initiatives
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
ECHO	European Union Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERF	emergency response fund
EU	European Union
FTS	OCHA Financial Tracking Service
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
INGO	international non-governmental organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LNGO	local non-governmental organization
L/NNGO	local or national NGO
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
NGO	non-governmental organization
NNGO	national non-governmental organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council

OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WFP	UN World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHAT'S WRONG?

The current humanitarian system—led by the United Nations, funded largely by a handful of rich countries, and managed almost always by those actors, large international non-governmental organizations (including Oxfam), and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement—has saved countless lives over the past 50 years. Moreover, it has done so with relatively little funding: less than what the world's major donors spend on subsidies to their farmers. Yet despite the best of intentions and efforts to reform, our global humanitarian system is overstretched. While many of the reasons are not due to the humanitarian system itself, too little is invested in disaster risk reduction and prevention, by both humanitarian and development actors, and assistance is often insufficient, inappropriate, and late. Simply put, we are not saving as many lives as we could. Further, the need for humanitarian assistance will only increase, given the trend toward more frequent and destructive disasters from natural hazards. The risks are higher for low-income people and communities in all countries.

In many cases, especially in smaller crises, humanitarian response that is conducted and led by local people and organizations—governments in countries affected by crises, assisted and held accountable by local civil societies—is faster and often more appropriate, and thus saves more lives. Local and national actors are almost always the first responders to sudden-onset crises (e.g., earthquakes and flash floods) and often the only responders in the critical hours immediately following a disaster. In situations of armed conflict, as in Sudan and Syria, only locals may be allowed access to those needing assistance. Local actors most likely understand the context on the ground better than even the best-prepared international organizations. For this reason, local actors usually are best placed to identify and address the particular needs of men and women, especially if there is meaningful representation of and leadership by women. Because local actors are assisting their families, friends, and fellow citizens, and because they remain in the community when the international humanitarian response ends, they tend to be more accountable to affected populations. Also, shifting the center of preparedness and response to the national and local level puts responsibility, decision making, and power where it should be: in the hands of the people affected most by crisis.

States have a duty to respect, protect, facilitate, and fulfill the rights of their citizens, and thus should have the primary role in both humanitarian preparedness and response. This is particularly the case with small- and medium-size, localized crises, which account for the vast majority of people affected by crises. Pushing for greater leadership by the actors in affected countries puts even greater pressure on them to fulfill their responsibilities by shifting the default leadership from the international system to national governments and by ensuring that civil society in those countries has the capacity and space to hold their governments to account.

Local humanitarian leadership is certainly not a panacea and is not always prudent or possible. There are, and will continue to be, governments that are unwilling to lead humanitarian efforts, or to do so in a responsible, equitable manner, and governments that are party to conflicts and cannot be trusted to protect all of their citizens; while beyond the focus of this report, holding governments accountable on protection and assistance issues is a critical task that is primarily the role of political actors and the UN Security Council, rather than humanitarian actors. There will also continue to be mega-crises to which no one country can respond alone and crises that render the local government and people unable to lead response efforts, particularly immediately after a

crisis. But even in those instances, the international community should change its modus operandi so that it looks first to see the existing capacity on the ground, in state entities (including subnational entities) and civil society, before taking the lead in humanitarian action or steamrolling over existing local capacity. If leadership by international actors is necessary, they should devote resources to supporting and developing local capacity in parallel to delivering the response.

In order to be able to conduct and lead disaster risk reduction, preparedness, and response efforts in their countries, local actors—governmental and non-governmental—need funds and sufficient capacity, including technical capacity (e.g., water and sanitation, shelter, humanitarian principles and standards), capacity on cross-cutting issues such as ensuring gender awareness and equity and monitoring and evaluation, and organizational capacity (e.g., financial and human resources systems). Nonetheless, Oxfam research has found that remarkably little humanitarian assistance goes directly to national and local actors in crisis-affected countries. Between 2007 and 2013, the resources provided directly to these actors averaged less than 2 percent of total annual humanitarian assistance. While that figure appears to have increased somewhat in 2014 to 3.2 percent, the percentage of direct funding to local NGOs appears to have actually decreased. Moreover, when international actors do provide direct funding to local actors, they frequently treat them not as true partners but as sub-contractors who are carrying out plans designed by the international actors with little ownership themselves.

WHO'S WRONG?

Despite increasing rhetoric about supporting local actors, the principal donors, the United Nations, the biggest international nongovernmental organizations (including Oxfam), and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement provide too few resources directly to local state and civil society actors. The quality of their assistance is also often lacking, delivered through unequal partnerships and with inadequate focus on capacity strengthening. The principal donors are stuck in the status quo, lacking incentives to change and unable to conceive of a new business model if they cede responsibility and leadership to local actors.

National governments bear the primary responsibility for disaster risk reduction, preparedness, and response in their countries, and should be leading the response, supported and held accountable by local and national civil society. Yet they often invest insufficiently because they lack the necessary resources, do not prioritize humanitarian action, or are a party to the conflict that is causing the crisis in the first place. If civil society in affected countries cannot hold their governments accountable, international actors can play this role, while committing to strengthen the technical and organizational capacity of civil society partners according to best practices.

Creating a global system in which the default is locally led humanitarian action requires turning the current system on its head. Many changes are required, including increased humanitarian assistance funding overall; increased direct funding of local actors; more balanced partnerships between international and local actors (prioritizing local actors that have a strong focus on the ways in which humanitarian crises affect men and women differently and actors that have strong female representation and leadership); more emphasis by international actors on quality capacity-strengthening of local partners; and increased commitment and accountability by national governments to sufficiently fund, and responsibly and equitably provide, disaster risk reduction, preparedness, and response in their own countries.

The primary constraint to needed change is donors' limited willingness to provide adequate, timely, and appropriate financial resources. This affects not only the creation of sustainable local capacity but also efforts to engage in meaningful international reforms. Both the inadequacies and imbalances in humanitarian financing stem from its voluntary nature. UN member states do not make mandatory payments to any humanitarian fund or agency, in sharp contrast to UN peacekeeping missions, which receive their funding from mandatory assessments charged to member states. Even the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas imposes mandatory dues. A voluntary system permits donors to focus only on the emergencies, sectors, and funding modalities that interest them. It heightens the power of domestic groups in donor countries to distort assistance priorities.

WHAT WRONG TO RIGHT?

Righting the wrong

There are several ways to enable the current system to shift toward more local leadership—with governments in crisis-affected countries at the helm, supported and held accountable by civil society—that will save more lives. The primary pathways include (1) locally led humanitarian action whenever possible, with a clear role for international actors; (2) adequate funding to state and non-state actors in affected countries; and (3) stronger partnerships between international and local actors, as well as greater emphasis on strengthening local capacity. National governments must also improve the quantity and quality of humanitarian action, but this report focuses on how international actors can and should increase and improve their support for local humanitarian leadership. Specifically, Oxfam recommends a mandatory assessment for humanitarian assistance funding and a commitment by international actors to increase their direct funding of local actors and to be transparent in such funding.

In our role as one of the largest humanitarian international non-governmental organizations, Oxfam is committed to being part of the solution, making it an organizational priority to increase our direct funding of local actors, to improve the quality of our partnerships and capacity-strengthening of state and non-state partners, and to advocate to all relevant actors for changes to the international system.

If we were to create a global humanitarian system today, we believe it would focus on national government leadership, supported and held accountable by civil society, and it would have resilient communities at its core, with international actors standing by to assist whenever necessary. This is not the system we have. We must "right the wrong." We must turn our current system on its head and strive toward such a system, which is more effective, efficient, and equitable.

1 INTRODUCTION

The global humanitarian system is stretched to its limits. As of the end of 2014, violent conflict and human rights violations had displaced nearly 60 million people, the highest number ever recorded.[1] For 2014, the United Nations (UN) appealed for assistance for 81 million people, including displaced persons and others affected by protracted conflicts and disasters from natural hazards.[2] The Ebola crisis has had a devastating social and economic impact on affected countries and has put millions of West Africans at risk of death. As of December 2014, the world faced four L3 crises—the UN classification for the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)[3]—in the Central African Republic (CAR), Iraq, South Sudan, and Syria. These calamities left more than 20 million people vulnerable to malnutrition, illness, violence, and death, and in need of aid and protection.[4] Responses to such large-scale humanitarian crises have been led by the UN and wealthy-country aid agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the European Union (EU) Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO), together with large international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement.

On the other hand, there are an increasing number of small- and medium-scale disasters from natural hazards (e.g., floods, droughts, landslides), which do not make the headlines but which nonetheless have a local if not national impact.[5] In many such crises, the affected government leads and manages a response, supported by local and national civil society.

The global system, led by the major actors, does not focus sufficiently on developing emergency prevention and response capabilities in affected countries. Instead, local governments and NGOs are often sidelined[6]—even if, as first responders and members of their communities, they are best placed to save lives and can do so in a more timely and effective way. Donor investments in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and preparedness have a high rate of return in terms of lives saved and damage prevented, as we have seen in South Asia, Central America, and East Africa, but evidence suggests that, between 1991 and 2010, only 0.4 percent of total official development assistance (ODA) went to DRR.[7]

Multiple rounds of humanitarian reform over the past quarter-century have not resolved these problems, and pressures on the humanitarian system as a whole are likely to intensify in the years ahead. Climate change will likely lead to increases in the number and intensity of droughts and storms,[8] and rapid urbanization is adding new complexities to humanitarian action.[9] A further complication is that many disasters and conflicts are occurring in the same places: During 2005-2009, more than half of people affected by "natural" disasters lived in fragile or conflict-affected states.[10]

The World Humanitarian Summit, to be held in Istanbul in May 2016, offers the international community an opportunity to discuss these serious challenges to the system and agree on ways forward, including overhauling the system so that it is locally led whenever possible.

"Everyone recognizes that the [current] system is done. It isn't working. OCHA knows it, and donors are starting to shift as well."
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) staff member (interview, May 2014).

Our vision is of a system in which local actors take ownership of humanitarian action. National governments, through their various entities and levels of government, organize and coordinate activities whenever possible. Local and national civil society—which are the first responders in any event, know the context better than anyone, and are often accountable to the communities they serve—work with their governments, supporting them and holding them to account. Humanitarian action reflects the context-specific needs of men, women, children, and marginalized communities, with state and non-state local actors that have representative leadership and membership. Government and civil society are able to conduct locally led DRR and preparedness that is informed by the needs and vulnerabilities of the communities. National governments and international actors invest appropriately in DRR and preparedness, which leads to less need for investment in humanitarian response down the road. National governments still require international assistance, particularly with large-scale crises, but the support is coordinated by the national government. International actors are still engaged, but their focus is more on supporting, rather than competing with, local leadership; they are investing adequately and comprehensively in effective capacity-strengthening; and they are investing far more funding directly in local actors.

Of course, this vision will not work in all circumstances. There are governments that do not have the will to meet their international obligations to protect and provide for their populations and that, in fact, target elements of their population with persecution, violence, and massive human rights abuses. We do not suggest empowering these governments. In such situations, the international community should provide humanitarian assistance to the best of its ability, while the international political system must hold those governments to account for perpetrating abuses and also prioritize protecting citizens caught up in conflict. But even in conflict settings, humanitarian actors should look for opportunities to strengthen the capacity of civil society and potentially even discrete elements of the government, although this must be done with great care.

WHAT IS "LOCAL", AND OTHER DEFINITIONS

In this report, we use the term "local" (e.g., "local actors," "local partners," "local government") to signify the crisis-affected country—in contrast to "international"; these entities may operate at the national, sub-national, or community level in those countries.

We differentiate between "local NGOs" (LNGOs), which operate within a limited area of a crisis-affected country, and "national NGOs" (NNGOs), which operate across most or all of a country. Often we refer to both (L/NNGOs), contrasting them to international NGOs (INGOs).

We define an INGO as an NGO that operates in more than one and often many countries. The overwhelming majority of INGOs are headquartered in states belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC).[11] INGOs' structure varies and can include affiliates and country offices. There are a small number of Southern-based NGOs that operate in multiple countries, with funding and constituency bases that are not limited to one country. These include BRAC, Mercy Malaysia, and Adeso.

We use the terms "natural disasters," in quotation marks, or "disasters from natural hazards" because hazards such as earthquakes and droughts are natural occurrences, but the disasters that often follow them (death, damage, etc.) result from human activity and public policies (e.g., failure to adopt and enforce building codes).[12]

When referring to "capacity," we include technical capacity (e.g., water and sanitation; shelter); capacity on overarching issues such as gender awareness and equity and monitoring and evaluation; and organizational capacity (e.g., financial and human resources systems).[13]

All currency figures are in US dollars, unless otherwise indicated.

METHODOLOGY

This paper reports on research carried out in 2013-2014. We reviewed the relevant literature (and Oxfam will publish a separate annotated bibliography on this topic); collected and analyzed data from the OECD and OCHA on the levels, uses, and recipient agencies of humanitarian assistance; and conducted semi-structured interviews with more than 70 experts on humanitarian policy and programs from both OECD and developing countries, including staff of UN agencies and NGOs, representatives of donor-government humanitarian aid agencies, and academic specialists.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The paper is organized as follows: The next chapter examines the deficiencies of the current humanitarian system. It is followed by a discussion of lack of incentives and institutional accountability to address the problems. The paper then examines constraints on reforming the system so that it transfers resources and power to local leadership in the South through investments in prevention, preparedness, and local capacity to lead humanitarian responses. Finally, we examine new ways to achieve such a systemic transformation.

2 WHAT'S WRONG? AN OPAQUE AND OVERSTRETCHED GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

The current global humanitarian system provides inadequate levels of aid that is often inappropriate, arrives too late, and is provided without transparency or accountability to affected people. It invests insufficiently in prevention, preparedness, and local humanitarian capacity. Efforts over the past 25 years to reform the system have resulted in important improvements, but the system remains deficient.

DEMAND OUTSTRIPPING SUPPLY

The current humanitarian system provides essential assistance to people affected by violent conflict and disasters from natural hazards, but the level of funding is inadequate and the resources provided do not necessarily align with assessed needs. As Figure 2.1 shows, humanitarian assistance averaged nearly $19 billion annually between 2008 and 2012. It totaled $22 billion in 2013, an all-time high and a 27 percent jump over the level of aid provided the previous year.[14] This accounted for nearly one of every six dollars of ODA,[15] with the increase stemming primarily from the need to respond to three large-scale crises, in the CAR, the Philippines, and Syria.

Figure 2.1: International humanitarian response, 2008–2013

Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014, 15 (Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives, 2014). Note: Figures for 2013 are preliminary estimates.

Despite the additional resources, humanitarian response in 2013 proved deficient in many ways. Donors covered only 65 percent of the funds that the UN requested in its appeals, leaving $4.6 billion in unmet needs.[16] This reflects a long-term trend: Oxfam research indicates that since 2000, on average, donors have met less than two-thirds of the needs specified in UN appeals.[17]

These shortfalls can have devastating consequences. In late 2014, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) suspended food aid to 1.7 million Syrian refugees due to inadequate funding. It was able to reinstate the assistance only after a social-media fundraising effort.[18]

Breaking down the gap between need and assistance by sector reveals that often aid is not based on the local context but on donor priorities (see Figure 2.2 and Box 2.1). For example, between 2009 and 2013, appeals for food assistance received 84 percent of

the amount requested for that sector while figures for other sectors were much lower, falling below one-third for protection.

Figure 2.2: Appeal requirements and proportions met by section in UN-coordinated appeals, 2009–2013

Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 74. Note: "Multi-sector" is predominantly used for multi-sector assistance to refugees.

In addition, the adequacy of response across emergencies and types of emergency varies widely. In 2012, nearly 80 percent of emergency aid from DAC members—who provided 89 percent of the humanitarian assistance from government donors that year—went to protracted crises in countries that are either long- or medium-term recipients. Protracted crises such as those in Syria, Sudan, Somalia, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory also absorbed a considerable share of the humanitarian assistance from non-DAC government donors, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.[19] Long-term, predictable resources for protracted emergencies are essential, but this concentration of humanitarian funding contributes to inadequate responses to smaller-scale, less publicized disasters from natural hazards.

> **Box 2.1: Imbalanced and inappropriate humanitarian assistance**
>
> Most donors respond to appeals for food assistance with a set of tools that includes in-kind food aid, cash for local and regional purchases of food, vouchers that recipients can use to purchase food, cash-for-work, and direct cash transfers that are critical for restarting local economies. Others, however, face more rigid policy and legal requirements. The US, which is the largest donor of food and humanitarian assistance, provides mostly in-kind food aid drawn from US harvests, regardless of recipient-country supply conditions. This practice can reduce local prices and farm income if not carefully managed, and can lead to long delays in the arrival of aid. In Haiti, for example, during the first nine months after the 2010 earthquake, the US (which accounted for 78 percent of all food aid to Haiti during that period) provided 72 percent of its food assistance as in-kind aid and only 28 percent as cash transfers and vouchers. By contrast, Canada, France, Brazil, and WFP provided assistance in the form of food purchases from Haitian farmers for use in both school feeding programs and emergency food baskets.[20]
>
> The large role of US-sourced, in-kind food aid reflects a sizeable problem of donors providing what they have on hand—such as boats, prefabricated shelters, ready-to-use therapeutic foods, or used clothing—whether or not these are most appropriate. Yet providing crisis-affected people with cash empowers them to decide how best to meet their needs.

Media attention appears to make a tremendous difference in the level of aid provided. The response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami offers perhaps the most extreme example of the results of disparate media attention. The media offered saturated coverage of the calamity, and donors provided $2,700 in aid per person affected. This compares to the $3 in aid to each person affected by the 2004 floods in Bangladesh, which received considerably less media notice, although they affected 30 million people, six times more than the tsunami.[21]

ASSISTANCE ARRIVES TOO LATE

Former UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) Jan Egeland has said, "Imagine if your local fire department had to petition the mayor for money to turn on the water every time a fire broke out."
Source: Jan Egeland, "Be Prepared," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 25, 2005.

Not only is there too little humanitarian assistance to meet the assessed needs, but aid also often arrives too late. Timeliness is a key metric for judging whether humanitarian assistance is effective. According to *The State of the Humanitarian System 2012* report, by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)*, "*There were concerns about delays in response in all three major emergencies since 2009—the drought and conflict in the Horn of Africa, the 2010 floods in Pakistan and the earthquake in Haiti."[22] A study by Oxfam and Save the Children found that a more timely response to early warnings of drought in the Horn in 2011—a response that would have preserved livelihoods and supported markets— could have reduced malnutrition rates, and "more substantial provision of food, nutrition, clean water and health services would have reduced the number of deaths."[23] Early analysis of the response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa suggests that the funding was "not too little, but definitely too late."[24] According to a local chief in Sierra Leone, "The cavalry [international community] wasn't coming. We were the cavalry."[25] When funding is delayed, it often means that local actors on the ground who are willing

and able to respond do not get the necessary resources, because they receive little direct funding and are usually at the very end of the humanitarian financing chain.

Timing varies widely across emergencies: Donors met 84 percent of the needs six months after the 2004 tsunami, but the figure for the Haiti earthquake was 68 percent; for the 2010 Pakistan floods, 67 percent; and for Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan in the Philippines, in 2013, just 56 percent. In general, slow-onset crises such as drought tend to receive a slower response than dramatic, rapid-onset crises such as tsunamis and earthquakes.[26] Timing is even more of a problem for conflict-related emergencies; appeals for aid to CAR, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen in 2013 were filled at less than 50 percent after six months.[27]

Lack of timely and predictable funding for humanitarian assistance stems from dependence on voluntary contributions donors. UN member states do not make mandatory payments to any humanitarian fund or agency. This is in sharp contrast to UN peacekeeping missions, which receive their funding from mandatory assessments charged to member states. Even the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas imposes mandatory dues.[28]

LACK OF INVESTMENT IN LOCAL CAPACITY

In 2013, donors provided 61 percent of humanitarian assistance to UN agencies and other multilateral organizations; the international Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement received 9 percent, and various public sector entities, 7 percent. NGOs received 19 percent, but almost all of that went to INGOs.[29]

"International financing for national NGOs, who are often at the sharp end of humanitarian response, is not fit for purpose. It is unpredictable, volatile, difficult to access, insufficient and it is not sufficiently enabling to support the strengthening and capacity development of national NGOs that is central to improving preparedness, standing response capacity and resilience to disasters."

Source: Lydia Poole, *Funding at the Sharp End: Investing in National NGO Response Capacity* (London: CAFOD, 2013), 4.

Oxfam research has found that little humanitarian assistance goes directly to national and local actors in crisis-affected countries. Between 2007 and 2013, the total resources provided directly to these actors averaged less than 2 percent annually (i.e., 1.87 percent).

Figure 2.3 shows that, during this period, when total humanitarian aid averaged $17.8 billion a year,[30] an average of just $313 million annually, or 1.8 percent of the total, went directly to recipient governments. The figure also indicates that the humanitarian assistance channeled to recipient governments in any given year fluctuates considerably, based on the number and type of emergencies experienced; the 2010 spike is attributable to the flow of aid to the government of Pakistan in response to the floods.

During the same period, donors provided even less direct funding to national and local NGOs. Figure 2.4 shows that these resources averaged $12.6 million each year, or 0.07 percent of humanitarian assistance.

Figure 2.3: Bilateral humanitarian funding to local governments, all donors, 2007–2013

Source: Oxfam calculations from OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data.

Figure 2.4: Bilateral humanitarian funding to local and national NGOs, all donors, 2007–2013

Source: Oxfam calculations from OCHA FTS data.

Preliminary figures for 2014 indicate that humanitarian assistance totaled an all-time record $24.5 billion, with 3 percent allocated directly to affected governments and just 0.2 percent going to L/NNGOs.[31]

Recent studies indicate that DAC donors' investments in supporting local actors have increased over past years. Donors' preferred channel for ODA (which includes both humanitarian and development aid) remains INGOs based in the donor country itself, but there is evidence this may be on the decline. In 2009, DAC members provided around five times more ODA to civil society organizations (CSOs) based in their countries than to international and local CSOs in developing countries; in 2011 this ratio fell to only twice as much.[32]

Some donors have legal or policy restrictions on direct funding of L/NNGOs. This is the case for the EU, which is legally bound to fund only humanitarian NGOs registered in Europe.[33] The funded European NGOs do frequently work in partnership with L/NNGOs, but these organizations do not receive direct funding. The EU recently evaluated this policy and decided to maintain it.[34]

In an effort to ascertain DAC donors' support for local capacity development, we examined their direct funding of local actors (for both humanitarian and development activities). Comparable data on non-DAC donors are difficult to come by. For DAC members, such funding increased dramatically from 2009 to 2010 but declined

thereafter.[35] We examined in some detail how much of this funding in 2013 went toward the development of humanitarian capacity in the recipient countries. Although there are serious limitations in the available data, we looked at DAC donors' reported investment in the capacity of national and regional actors to prevent, prepare for, and respond to disasters. We were able to identify investments of $492 million. This is equivalent to just 3.5 percent of the $14.1 billion in humanitarian assistance that DAC donors provided that year (although the funds came from both humanitarian and development aid).[36] More than 80 percent of this investment went to national institutions (i.e., governmental entities) (Figure 2.5).

To be sure, there is growing diversity of donors beyond DAC members.[37] Private donors (such as individuals, companies, foundations) accounted for 25 cents of every dollar of humanitarian aid in 2013, whereas non-DAC governments provided 10 cents.[38] Among government donors, Turkey and Persian Gulf states have become substantial donors of humanitarian assistance; in recent years, Turkey has been among the five leading donors.[39] Because many of these non-traditional donors do not report their assistance to the DAC, and often do not report to OCHA, it is difficult to know much about the quality of their assistance.[40] In particular, to what extent does it support local actors and develop local humanitarian capacity? It is also not clear if the aid complies with international humanitarian principles and standards and if it is accountable to affected people. These are all issues for further research. At present, we know that Saudi Arabia primarily channels its assistance through the UN, and Turkey provides much of its assistance to refugees whom it hosts, so these two donors are not providing substantial resources directly to local actors.[41]

Figure 2.5: Disaster prevention, preparedness, and response capacity-strengthening investments by DAC donors by societal level targeted

2013

National institutions	396.8
Multi-level	36.5
Local Red Cross/Crescent	30.1
Community-level	13.3
Supra-national	12.9
Civil-society groups	2.5

US$ MILLION (CONSTANT 2012 PRICES)

*Source: Oxfam calculations from DAC Creditor Reporting System (DAC CRS) data.*

The first-level recipients of humanitarian assistance frequently pass funds on to local partners in crisis-affected countries, relying on them for program implementation. For example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) works closely with National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies; Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) partner with local Caritas agencies; and Oxfam partners with a wide variety of national and local entities, both governmental and NGO. Yet, because of a lack of publicly available data, it is extremely difficult to assess the total volume of funding that is passed from one organization to another (see Figure 2.6). Currently, there is no standardized reporting system that can trace funds from donor to all levels of recipients.

UN-administered pooled humanitarian funds—to which multiple donors contribute—account for about 5 percent of total humanitarian funding annually and represent an

important channel through which local and national actors gain access to resources. However, the total volumes of funds and the proportions channeled to national actors vary substantially across funds. Oxfam research indicates that national NGOs received an average of about 8 percent of the resources that country-based Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) provided during 2006-2013.[42] Some local organizations have reported having difficulty in accessing the funds.[43] CHFs support projects outlined in UN-coordinated response plans. Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) are small country-level funds that provide rapid and flexible funding to fill unforeseen needs outside the UN-coordinated plans. These are designed to disburse smaller grants, primarily through NGOs, and to support capacity-strengthening of local organizations.[44] Oxfam research has found that NNGOs received a substantial share of resources from ERFs between 2010 and 2013, an average of 40 percent annually, but the majority went to UN agencies and INGOs.[45] The two largest humanitarian donors, the US and the EU, do not participate in CHFs and ERFs; this limits the capacity of these vehicles to provide resources to local and national humanitarian actors.

The third and largest UN humanitarian pooled fund, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), received and disbursed $485 million in 49 countries in 2012. It has improved the timeliness of funding, because its grant facility disburses quite rapidly, and it has helped address the problem of unfunded and underfunded emergencies and sectors. However, as per the General Assembly resolution that created the Fund, the CERF provides funds only to UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration, so it is not a direct source of funds for local actors. Nevertheless, NGOs (international, national, and local) and local government entities receive approximately 20 percent of CERF's total funding from the direct recipients to implement programs.[46] Figures are not available on what part of the 20 percent goes to L/NNGOs.

Figure 2.6: Humanitarian funding channels, 2012

Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 57.

WHAT'S RIGHT? IMPORTANCE OF COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

Locally led humanitarian action can overcome the problems inherent in the current top-down humanitarian system. In many instances, local leadership means more timely response that is based on better knowledge of the local context, saving more lives, possibly at lower cost. It is also right, whenever possible, for national governments to be leading humanitarian assistance efforts in their countries, supported and held accountable by their civil society. As CAFOD's 2013 report on funding to local actors has pointed out, "Local response capacity matters far more than many international actors prefer to acknowledge."[47] In some situations, locally led humanitarian action is not possible or advisable, including conflict settings where the government is a party to the conflict and in situations where the government is not willing or able to provide effective, impartial humanitarian assistance to people in need; further research and analysis is needed to consider the ways in which the international community can support capacity-strengthening of civil society and discrete government entities in such situations. Keeping that caveat in mind, we now explore how local leadership can contribute to effective humanitarian action.

Local leadership saves lives

First responders

Timely responses mean fewer lives lost, fewer injuries, and less damage.[48] Local and national actors are almost always first responders to sudden-onset crises and often are the only responders in the critical 72 hours following a disaster from a rapid-onset natural hazard.[49] An evaluation of the response to the 2004 tsunami reported, "Local people provided almost all immediate life-saving action and early emergency support, as is commonly the case in disasters."[50] They can often engage in early action, such as advance evacuation, whereas an international response is generally able to begin only after a crisis occurs. For example, in advance of Cyclone Phailin, in October 2013, local government authorities in India evacuated nearly one million vulnerable people, an unprecedented action credited with saving countless lives.[51] Local communities are also best placed to detect the signs of slow-onset emergencies, such as droughts.[52]

> "Local NGOs—and local people—are always the biggest pool of responders. They are always most effective and cost-effective."
> John Ging, Operations Director, OCHA, remarks at InterAction Forum, June 2014.

Context knowledge

Local and national actors understand the context better than even the best-prepared international actors, including the language(s), customs, history, power dynamics and imbalances, and existing resilience and capacity (in government, civil society, the private sector, and the diaspora).[53] Evaluations of the 2010 Haiti earthquake response, for example, found "a limited understanding of the context, particularly the urban setting; by-passing of local authorities and civil society groups; and insufficient communication with affected populations" due to the failure to engage local actors.[54] Of course, local actors may also reflect and perpetuate existing inequalities in societies, and we must be vigilant about this. Because it engages local knowledge, however, locally led humanitarian assistance is more likely to be relevant and appropriate for the context, and thus more responsive to the needs of the population,[55] as opposed to much of current international assistance.

Importantly, local actors, particularly local female actors, are more likely than international actors to know how a particular crisis may affect women differently from men (Box 2.3). It is more likely that local actors more than international actors will understand the underlying gender dynamics in a community, the specific risks to women, and approaches to humanitarian assistance that are appropriate given the risks and culture.

Box 2.3: Gender-specific experiences of women in humanitarian crises

Humanitarian crises can affect women, men, girls, and boys in radically different ways, changing social and cultural structures and redefining women's and men's statuses—in both positive and negative ways.[56] For example:

- Women often have higher death rates than men due to disasters from natural hazards and conflicts.[57] For example, up to three times more women died in the 2005 Pakistan earthquake.[58]
- Gender-based violence—including domestic violence—rises dramatically during and in the wake of crises, because of lost livelihoods, crowded living conditions, psychological trauma, limited policing, and stress.[59] After the 2011 cyclones, a Vanuatu counseling center recorded a 300 percent increase in gender-based violence referrals.[60] In conflict settings, gender-based violence is often used as a weapon.[61]
- Reproductive health services are often unavailable in emergencies.[62]
- Crises tend to reinforce the status of women that existed beforehand: Women are generally poorer than men, have little political voice, face obstacles to freedom of movement, and may not be allowed to own land.[63] Crises also tend to reinforce traditional gender roles, with women as primary caretakers, meaning that they usually end up caring for those affected by the crisis (children and injured and elderly people).[64]

Humanitarian interventions therefore need to take gender dynamics into account.[65]

Learning lessons

Leaders of local government or civil society can strengthen their expertise with each successive response, working toward what author Malcolm Gladwell calls the "10,000-hour rule of success,"[66] which will enable locally led responses to save lives and make good decisions better than an internationally led response. The Philippine government learned from its experience with Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan in November 2013, when Typhoon Ruby/Hagupit was approaching in 2014. Working with civil society, it undertook preparedness measures and evacuated nearly 1 million people from the riskiest areas. These measures are credited with drastically decreasing the scale of deaths and damage resulting from the storm.[67] When responses are internationally led, on the other hand, local actors do not have the same opportunities to learn, and the international system struggles to institutionalize applicable lessons for the next international response, as we have seen in evaluations from the earthquake in Haiti and the 2004 tsunami.[68]

Access

In situations like Darfur, Somalia, and Syria, local and national NGOs may be the only organizations granted access to conflict or controversial areas by states or armed non-state actors,[69] leaving locally led assistance and remote management by international actors as the only options. In remote management situations, defined by OCHA as situations in which international staff withdraw from a country or part of a country for security reasons and transfer program responsibilities to local staff or partner organizations,[70] international actors often have no choice but to cede most responsibility and decision-making authority to local actors.[71] However, in many such situations, international actors still want to design and make key decisions about

interventions, despite being removed from the situation on the ground. In truly locally led responses, local actors would take charge of or be equally involved in the design and key decisions about the intervention and would be held accountable to donors and the affected population.

Cost effective

Although no comprehensive studies have been conducted on the subject, there is discrete evidence of components of locally led responses being more cost effective than are those in internationally led responses. According to research by ALNAP as well as a study by Oxfam Great Britain and four other UK-based INGOs, the costs that are likely to be lower in a locally led response include labor, overhead expenses of NGOs, start-up expenses, supplies, travel and lodging, shipment, and security.[72] A report for DFID found that WFP programs in Niger and Mozambique that invested in local partners to grow supplies to use in the next emergency response resulted in significant cost savings.[73] In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a local organization reintegrated soldiers for $153 per person compared with the $300-750 typically quoted by international agencies.[74] Furthermore, if more funding is provided directly to governments and civil society in affected countries, the transaction costs associated with passing funds to subsequent recipients will be saved.[75] These costs include overhead and staff time for program officers and others involved in selecting partners and managing sub-grants.

Comprehensive and accountable approach

Local actors generally do not operate in the same compartmentalized environment as INGOs, where DRR, disaster preparedness, resilience, response, and development are handled within different silos, or by different organizations.[76] Because local agencies are a constant presence and engage with communities on an ongoing basis, they are also more likely to be accountable to crisis-affected populations.[77]

Although accountability to affected people is squarely on the UN humanitarian reform agenda,[78] one knowledgeable practitioner says that there has been "almost no progress." He adds that the international humanitarian community's language makes it clear that the leading international actors retain all the power: "'*We* listen to the people we *serve*, because we have the money, staff, and expertise.' The message is not, 'We facilitate the active engagement of people affected by crisis in forging the solutions.'"[79]

Accountable local leadership is right

There are principle- and value-based reasons that locally led and accountable humanitarian action is preferable in many situations to an internationally led response. Shifting the center of preparedness and response from the international level to the national and local level puts responsibility, decision making, and power where it should be: in the hands of the people affected most by a disaster, conflict, or other major crisis.[80]

Given their duty to respect, protect, facilitate, and fulfill the rights of their citizens,[81] states have the responsibility to take care of and act with accountability to their people and thus should have the primary role in both humanitarian preparedness (including DRR) and response.

"If we were starting now and constructing the international system, it would make sense to build up local actors and to create international actors to support them."

Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian Outcomes (interview, May 2014)

Local leadership is not always possible

Local humanitarian leadership is certainly not a panacea and will not be prudent or possible in every situation but should always be considered at the onset of a crisis. Box 2.4 addresses some of the arguments against locally led humanitarian assistance. That said, there are several broad categories in which international actors should continue to lead humanitarian assistance. First, there will continue to be "mega" crises—"natural disasters," conflicts, and combinations of both—to which no one country can respond alone. As the international community saw with the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, in Japan, and Hurricane Katrina, in the US in 2005, even the world's richest countries may need external aid to cope with large-scale crises.

Second, there are and will continue to be disasters from natural hazards that render affected governments unable to function or lead a response, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a sudden-onset crisis. The key in such situations is for international actors to turn leadership of humanitarian response over to the government as soon as it is capable.

Third, there will also continue to be governments that are unwilling to lead humanitarian efforts in their country or to do so responsibly and equitably. This may occur in conflict situations, where the government is a party to the conflict and refuses to protect all of its citizens, or where there is no overt conflict, such as following recent floods in Malaysia, when aid was found to have been delivered along lines of political affiliation and religion.[82]

Box 2.4: Responses to arguments against locally led humanitarian action

There are a number of arguments made against moving toward a more locally led humanitarian assistance system, some of which are rational, well-founded concerns and some of which are not. All of these could be the subjects of further research:

- **There is not close to the level of needed technical capacity among local actors in many countries**. Recent research by Oxfam and others found that NNGOs, in fact, may have considerably greater capacity and coverage than most INGOs in some settings.[83] In other settings, local actors should lead humanitarian action if possible, and international actors should supplement local capacity while working to strengthen that capacity.

- **Local NGOs do not have sufficient absorptive capacity and are not sustainable.** While international actors can maintain a "standing" humanitarian capacity because they are able to fundraise from many different crises in different locations, in many cases LNGOs cannot because they have to rely on crises to receive funding.[84] Smart practices in capacity-strengthening (see Chapter 5), an increase in predictable direct funding to LNGOs, and a re-examination of donor expectations on reporting could strengthen local actors' absorptive capacity and, ultimately, government entities' capacity to lead responses.

- **Locally led responses are significantly more corrupt.** Although it is very difficult to monitor and evaluate corruption in the humanitarian sector,[85] it certainly exists in both locally led and internationally led humanitarian action, by both international and local actors.[86] As Jemilah Mahmood has said, "Corruption happens in developed countries, too. People are corrupt, not countries."[87] Yet there is a "veil of silence" over wrongdoing by international actors. Importantly, there is *no evidence* of increased corruption in locally led responses.[88] Oxfam research actually suggests that anti-corruption efforts are more likely to succeed when they are locally driven.[89]

- **Locally led responses compromise humanitarian principles.** Humanitarian principles center on a needs-based impartial provision of assistance.[90] There is no evidence that local actors and locally led humanitarian assistance follow these principles less than international actors.[91] Partnering with multiple groups or L/NNGOs from various geographic areas, ethnicities, religions, and political perspectives can help ensure that assistance is impartial in conflict settings.[92] This is Oxfam's approach in Somalia, for example.

- **Local actors in government and civil society are predominantly male and do not have the gender awareness that most INGOs now have.** This is a real and valid concern at both the local and international level.[93] Oxfam staff have observed that, where local partners receive funding from the UN or INGOs, they are rarely women's rights organizations and are mostly institutional copies of the INGOs that fund them, complete with the patriarchal ways of working and attitudes.[94] As mentioned before, locally led humanitarian action presents a real opportunity for preparedness (including DRR) and response that is tailored to a community's particular gender context. But there needs to be significant and meaningful representation of women in all humanitarian entities and an awareness of and commitment to gender-sensitive practices.

- **"Local leadership" is a euphemism for international actors' passing risk on to local actors.** Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is the most outspoken proponent of this argument, stating that when INGOs localize humanitarian assistance, they are "hanging local actors out to dry" when the local actors do not have sufficient capacity, transferring risk to them and abandoning them, rather than empowering them.[95] It is true that local actors usually face the most risk in humanitarian crises, particularly in conflicts, at least in part because they stay on when international actors leave for security reasons.[96] The presence of international actors often provides some protection. However, Oxfam believes that local actors face the most risk regardless of whether local or international actors are leading humanitarian assistance efforts. In fact, Oxfam believes that the inherent risk to local actors is one of the reasons why it is local actors with the necessary capacity that should, whenever possible, be in the driver's seat of decision-making.

- **"Local leadership" can be used as an excuse by unwilling governments that do not want to see INGOs operating, no matter what their added value.** This is a real risk, particularly in conflict situations, and must be carefully monitored.

- **Local leadership means there no longer is a role for INGOs.** As noted elsewhere in this report, the roles of INGOs will change with strengthened local capacity and leadership, but INGOs will remain engaged in humanitarian action.

3 WHO'S WRONG? NO INCENTIVES OR INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

We now turn to consider the actors responsible for the current system, which will be essential in shifting more power to local leadership. Oxfam has identified two main sets of actors: 1) major players in the current humanitarian system, and 2) national governments in many crisis-affected countries.

MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

In a recent paper, humanitarian studies scholars Michael Barnett and Peter Walker referred to "a Western-owned and operated Humanitarian Club that stands to lose power and resources if meaningful reforms produce a more genuinely inclusive humanitarian governance. In short, the Club is very good at protecting the interests of its members."[97] They describe this "club" as "a relatively small group of states, international organizations, and NGOs organized through the United Nations system that directs the humanitarian system." For Oxfam, the major players include the OECD DAC donors, the largest INGOs (Oxfam itself among them), the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement (including the IFRC and the International Committee of the Red Cross, or ICRC), and the UN. These key actors receive most of the money, act as the primary powerbrokers in the current system, and may have the most to lose in a system that gives more resources and decision making directly to local actors, including national governments in crisis-affected countries. Currently, there are no clear incentives for major players to spearhead change, even in an overwhelmed system. As a result, these actors and their current way of operating are the primary obstacles to reforming the system so that it emphasizes local leadership.

Dominance of few key actors

Preliminary figures suggest that, worldwide, government donors gave a total of $16.4 billion in humanitarian assistance in 2013, which accounted for 75 percent of total contributions.[98] OECD DAC members have dominated government contributions for some time. In 2013, their assistance increased by almost 20 percent, although non-DAC government contributions increased even more, by 58 percent. Nonetheless, DAC members provided 86 percent ($14.1 billion) of humanitarian aid from governments (Figure 3.1).[99]

If the members of the DAC are the preponderant sources of humanitarian spending, other major players are the biggest recipients of those funds. In 2012, three-fifths (61 percent) of international humanitarian assistance went directly to UN agencies and other multilateral organizations; 16 percent went to INGOs; and 10 percent went to the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement (Figure 3.2).

Among INGOs, a small group accounts for a large percentage of overall humanitarian spending. ALNAP mapped 4,400 NGOs in the international humanitarian system in 2012, 18 percent of which were INGOs.[100] In 2009 and 2010, five INGO federations or organizations—MSF, CRS,[101] Oxfam, Save the Children, and World Vision—accounted for 38 percent of the total humanitarian spending by INGOs.[102] Below that top tier, there is a group of 25 to 30 INGOs whose humanitarian expenditure is also above $100 million per year.[103]

Figure 3.1: OECD DAC and non-DAC donor share of humanitarian spending, 2004–2013

Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 26.

Figure 3.2: First-level recipients of humanitarian spending, 2012

HUMANITARIAN FUNDING CHANNELS (2012)

Source: Adapted by Oxfam from Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014. Note: "Red Cross" refers to the ICRC, IFRC, and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. "Public sector" includes national and lower levels of government in both donor and recipient countries, and may also include situations in which the donor delegates implementation of a given activity to another donor country.

OECD DAC: Choosing the UN over local actors

During 2008-2012, OECD DAC donors channeled the vast majority of their humanitarian assistance to multilateral institutions (60 percent) and INGOs. In contrast, non-DAC donors are more likely to provide funds to governments in crisis-affected countries (Figure 3.3).[104]

Our research found that DAC donors provided just $283.8 million, or 2 percent of their bilateral humanitarian aid, directly to local actors in 2013, less than in the three preceding years (Figure 3.4). In 2013, 71.8 percent ($204 million) of that funding to local actors went to governments, as seen in Figure 3.5, with the remaining $79.8 million going to local civil-society actors. As this figure indicates, the vast majority of the funds provided to local NGOs was earmarked, project-, or program-based funding, with only $3.9 million in core funding which is essential to supporting local organizations' growth and sustainability.

Figure 3.3: First-level recipients of international humanitarian assistance by donor type, 2008-2012

US$61.2bn

DAC donors
1.7 | 6.1 | 11.6 | 5.2 | 36.5

US$3.5bn

Non-DAC donors
0.4 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 1.5

US$3.5bn

Private funding
0.01 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.3

■ Public sector   ■ NGOs   ■ RCRC   ■ Multilateral organisations   ■ Other

Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 58 (Based on DAC CRS and OCHA FTS data). Note: NGOs include international, national, and local NGOs but are overwhelmingly international. RCRC is the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement.

**Figure 3.4: Direct humanitarian funding to local actors by DAC, 2010-2013 (constant 2012 prices)**

■ Funding to recipient government   ■ Core funding to LGNOs
■ Funding to local organizations   — % of billateral HA

Source: Oxfam calculations from DAC CRS data.

Many DAC donors, including Norway and Belgium—as well as ECHO[105]—have policies that preclude direct funding of L/NNGOs in crisis-affected countries.

There is also a trend toward donor aid agencies giving larger grants to organizations with absorptive capacity, in order to decrease the high transaction costs involved in making many small grants.[106] This trend makes it more difficult for local actors, which often have less absorptive capacity (see Box 2.4), to obtain direct donor funding, since their lower capacity means they need small grants. Donors need to invest in their own capacity to evaluate and disburse grants, in order to reduce their propensity to favor fewer and larger grants.

Figure 3.5: DAC donors' humanitarian funding to local actors, 2013 ($ million) (constant 2012 prices)

Source: Oxfam calculations from DAC CRS data.

Restrictive donor policies and requirements

CAFOD's 2013 report found funding of local actors not "fit for purpose" (i.e., not the system we need). This pronouncement emerged partly from the quantity of direct funding, but equally from the means through which international actors structure and provide humanitarian funding. For example, there are a number of DAC member funding policies and requirements that make it difficult, if not impossible, for many local actors—both governmental and non-governmental—to secure funding or grow in a sustainable manner or both.[107] Sixty-three percent of respondents to CAFOD's survey of Southern NGOs said that it has become more difficult to gain access to international funding in the past few years. Many funding opportunities through the DAC donors involve a long period of review before an award is made. For example, CAFOD survey respondents reported struggling with USAID's pre-award audit processes.[108]

While donor vetting and reporting systems are entirely justified to avoid risks such as funding going to terrorist organizations, money laundering, and corruption, often such systems impose barriers to local actors' access to donor funds and also potentially inhibit INGOs from funding local partners because of fear of risk.[109] For example, the US plan to conduct a five-country pilot of a Partner Vetting System, which would require USAID implementing partners to submit detailed personal information about their leadership and key project staff in order to prevent funds from supporting terrorist groups,[110] could deter L/NNGOs from partnering with USAID if they lack the capacity to provide the detailed information. This in turn could undermine the USAID Forward agenda, which seeks to boost the share of agency spending going directly to local actors to at least 30 percent. Stringent vetting could also diminish NGOs' viability and effectiveness by causing staff attrition.[111]

The United States, the EU, and other DAC donors also continue to give funding on short timelines, which constrains the continuous growth of both governmental and non-governmental local actors.[112] Short funding cycles are particularly problematic for L/NNGOs, because they require recipients to spend more time researching and applying for funding; make it more likely that programming will be reactive rather than strategic; and can impede L/NNGOs' accountability to the populations they serve, since they must focus heavily on accountability to donors. When the CAFOD study asked Southern NGOs to identify changes that international actors could make to better support their ability to prepare for, respond to, and build resilience to disasters, longer-term funding was the top answer.[113]

**Humanitarian assistance funding not in balance**

The balance of humanitarian funding among all donors within DRR, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and recovery may save more lives and be more efficient if it is more heavily shifted toward DRR. Investments in disaster risk reduction, disaster management capacity, and prevention and preparedness activities more generally[114] are cost effective, although benefit-cost ratio estimates vary considerably. A 2013 study for DFID found ratios of 2.9:1 or even higher for lives saved, damage averted, and crisis aid not needed as a result of resilience-oriented investments.[115] These investments cover such projects as establishing a robust national disaster management agency, building well-constructed and well-provisioned storm shelters, and developing effective early warning systems. Successful DRR programming depends on engaging local actors who know the local context risks, capabilities, etc.

The OECD DAC countries' funding of DRR and disaster preparedness, as a whole, has fallen far short of the UN Office for DRR-recommended 10 percent of total humanitarian funding, ranging from 2.9-6.2 percent over the past five years. That said, the funding of DRR and preparedness by these donors has been increasing slowly over that period,[116] though this may have as much to do with improved reporting as with changing spending levels.

According to the most recent data looking at the top OECD DAC donors individually, only Japan, Australia, and Norway devoted more than 10 percent of their humanitarian spending to DRR and disaster preparedness in 2012 (Figure 3.6).[117] In contrast, the US, Canada, and the UK allocated less than 5 percent.[118]

DAC members and other bilateral donors generally do not fund DRR and preparedness with development funds, instead funding it as a largely humanitarian activity.[119] But reducing the inequalities that make people more vulnerable to the shocks and stresses that they face requires development aid as well as humanitarian aid and integration of humanitarian and development programming.[120]

Figure 3.6: DRR and preparedness (DPP) funding from top OECD DAC donors as share of their bilateral humanitarian assistance, 2012

Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, Figure 6.9, 78.

UN agencies: Choosing INGOs over local actors?

As Figure 3.2 shows, UN agencies and other multilateral organizations are the primary first-level recipients of international humanitarian assistance. They are also the dominant players in the UN-led Cluster System that coordinates humanitarian aid.[121]

Among the multilateral organizations, the UN agencies dominate in terms of funding received. They are by far the largest first-level recipients of humanitarian assistance. In

2012, they received more than half of all international humanitarian assistance from government donors ($6.5 billion).[122] Of this, 78 percent ($5.2 billion) went to four UN agencies: WFP, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). WFP receives more funding than the other three put together,[123] which reflects the high percentage of humanitarian assistance that is directed toward the food security sector.

UN and other multilateral agencies pass on a portion of this funding to implementing partners. For example, in 2011, WFP had 2,045 partnerships with NGOs; more than 90 percent of these were with local NGOs. However, INGOs continue to handle the largest amounts of food for the agency, and are engaged in the largest number of sectors (these organizations also generally operate in collaboration with local partners).[124] Whereas WFP implements primarily through NGOs, in some countries it partners with the government, e.g., in Ethiopia, where the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development receives WFP support for the Productive Safety Net Program and other initiatives.[125]

In the case of UNHCR, the agency passed $896 million on to implementing partners in 2012. L/NNGOs received $319 million, representing 14 percent of the total funds received by UNHCR in that year (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7: UNHCR funds disbursed to implementing partners, disaggregated by partner type, 2004-2012

Source: Oxfam calculations from UNHCR data.

However, beyond WFP and UNHCR, assessing the total volume of funding that UN agencies pass to partners is challenging. The other agencies do not systematically collect data on the volume or share of their expenditure that partner organizations implement, and UN and DAC humanitarian funding tracking systems do not include reporting beyond the first-level recipient; as a result, arrangements beyond this level constitute a "black box" (Figure 2.5).[126]

The role of regional inter-state organizations

Regional institutions such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation's Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Affairs Department,[127] the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),[128] the Central American Integration System's Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America (CEPREDENAC), and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency have been engaged for some time in DRR, preparedness, and response. This engagement takes many forms and includes disaster preparedness and response; conflict management; the facilitation of

humanitarian aid to refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs), and crisis-affected populations; and the development of policies, institutional frameworks, and procedures on humanitarian assistance, response preparedness, and addressing vulnerability.[129] ASEAN, the AU, and ECOWAS all have strong regional strategies for DRR and disaster risk management.[130]

Although regional organizations have different mandates and different ways of working, they could all potentially help strengthen the capacity of governments and civil society in crisis-affected countries to conduct DRR, preparedness, and emergency response.[131] When national governments, supplemented by their own civil society, do not have sufficient resources to engage in humanitarian action, regional institutions often work in a complementary fashion with, or as an alternative to, the UN, other global multilateral institutions, and Northern INGOs. Humanitarian action led by regional organizations may be more context-appropriate than internationally led efforts, and more palatable to the national government.[132] One research institution has predicted that in the face of an increasing number of governments' wariness of the Northern-, UN-led international humanitarian system, regional organizations may eventually be the preferred conduit for external assistance.[133] One recent example of regional humanitarian action was the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Center), providing support to the Philippine government following Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan.[134]

In many cases, the impact of the regional organizations in terms of capacity-strengthening and advancing the leadership potential of local actors in particular, and in humanitarian action more generally, has been highly uneven. This is because of these organizations' often-constraining mandates, small budgets, tensions within the countries in the region, and the already crowded field of humanitarian actors.[135]

Major INGOs and the Red Cross: Also not choosing local actors

INGOs generally do not disclose information about their spending, and there is a real absence of data on how much funding they pass on to their governmental and non-governmental partners. CAFOD's 2013 report on investing in national NGO response capacity is the only public report that presents data on this second level of humanitarian spending, and it focused only on funding to civil society, not government entities. It presented data from five UK-based INGOs, which ranged in the share of their humanitarian funding that they provided to L/NNGOs from 82 to 16 percent (Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.8: Direct funding of L/NNGOs by INGOs, as share of total humanitarian expenditure, 2011

Source: Lydia Poole, *Funding at the Sharp End: Investing in National NGO Response Capacity* (London: CAFOD, 2013), 19. Note that data for Christian Aid is based on financial year 2012-13.

This range reflects how some humanitarian and multi-mandate INGOs (e.g., CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam Novib in the Netherlands) implement humanitarian programming almost entirely through local partners, whereas others are largely operational, conducting direct service delivery (e.g., MSF, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)), and many are somewhere along the spectrum.

Red Cross/Red Crescent movement

The Red Cross/Red Crescent movement—the ICRC, the IFRC, and the national Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal societies—received 9 percent of all international humanitarian funding in 2012 ($1.2 billion).[136] This sum exceeds the funding provided to L/NNGOs and the public sector, which includes all government entities that receive humanitarian assistance. The IFRC and the ICRC both issue their own appeals, separate from those of the UN. The IFRC receives the majority of its funding (65-96 percent between 2008 and 2012) from private sources, whereas the majority of the ICRC's funding is from governments.[137] The IFRC focuses on responses to disasters from natural hazards and development work; the ICRC's mandate is protection of, and assistance to, people affected by armed conflict and other violence.[138]

The IFRC calls itself "the world's largest humanitarian organization." Its 189 member National Societies create a network that allows the organization "to reach individual communities."[139] Although the IFRC has focused on and made a contribution in assisting governments to develop the legal infrastructure for DRR, preparedness, and response,[140] its direct funding of its national societies remains low: In 2011, the IFRC directed only 11 percent of its total humanitarian expenditure ($57 million) to the National Societies.[141]

What about the Golden Rule? The key actors' treatment of local actors

A number of reports have examined the quality of INGOs' partnerships with national and local NGOs. Each one has found that, at present, INGOs largely do not treat their local partners as equals or contribute in a meaningful way to their growth and capacity development.

ALNAP's 2012 *State of the Humanitarian System* asserted:

[D]onors rarely fund national NGOs directly, nor support sustained capacity-building measures via INGOs. In particular, funding for national NGOs via international agencies rarely provides the necessary longer-term support for building up office infrastructure, administrative and financial capacity, including hiring permanent staff, as well as covering operational and running costs. Training and capacity building are the most susceptible to cuts if proposals exceed available budgets.[142]

CAFOD's 2013 report on the funding of L/NNGOs found:

International donors and non-governmental organisations working in 'partnership' with national actors must shift their thinking and their money towards investing in national civil society actors as an end in itself, and not just as a means to an end. . . . [A]t a more formative level, international actors must urgently revisit their commitments to build local disaster response capacities and work in partnership in a principled way which makes equality of local actors in dialogue and response a reality, not just a paper commitment.[143]

In CAFOD's survey of Southern L/NNGOs, an "increased role for national NGOs in identifying needs and prioritizing responses" was the second-highest priority for change by international actors.[144]

Christian Aid's report on partnerships and local capacity in humanitarian assistance, also published in 2013, reached a similar conclusion:

Learning from recent humanitarian responses suggests that partnerships between international aid agencies and southern organisations can often fall short of genuine supportive collaboration. Partnerships can be in name only and southern organisations can be treated simply as a pipeline for delivery, with little say in their work and little sense of sustainability or of shared learning and mutual accountability. Where investment in supporting local partners is not sufficient, then their ability to deliver responses to time and to the desired standard can be impaired.[145]

Many of the interviews that we conducted with humanitarian thought leaders as part of this research corroborated these assessments. Interviewees made the following points:

- "The problem is that when an emergency strikes, [local actors] aren't respected. Funders don't want to fund local partners for humanitarian work, even when they do so for DRR."[146]
- "Most international actors use local actors as contractors."[147]
- "Humanitarian assistance debilitates local capacity all the time. Just look at Aceh, Pakistan…."[148]

Many independent evaluations of emergency responses have reached similar conclusions about the ways in which international humanitarian actors treat local actors.[149]

As we have mentioned, there is a wide range in the approach that INGOs take toward working with, and working to strengthen the capacity of local partners. Some organizations, like Christian Aid, implement their programming almost entirely through local partners and have as part of their mission strengthening those partners. Some organizations do not even claim to work in partnerships with, or work to strengthen the capacity of, local actors. Such activities are not part of the narrower mandates of MSF and the NRC.[150] INGOs' approach vis-à-vis partners may also be a function of their own donors' restrictions.

As one of the key actors in the current humanitarian system, Oxfam recognizes that we are, in fact, part of "the problem." We have committed to more effective crisis response, both through our own capacity and increasingly through strengthening the capacity of partners and communities. Our Strong Local Humanitarian Actors Program, launched in 2015, focuses on building local capacity, providing local actors with the space to lead humanitarian action, changing our own ways of working, and convincing others to do the same. We have set as a goal to have local partners in the countries where we work leading the responses to the lowest level of crises (Category 3, in Oxfam's system). In addition to strengthening the capacity of states and civil society generally, we have committed to engaging women and women's organizations in partnerships and capacity-strengthening. We are also supporting civil society organizations to hold their governments accountable for the provision of DRR, preparedness, and response activities and to pass or strengthen laws regarding these areas. We are strengthening our partners' capacity to build networks and coalitions, as well as their advocacy and lobbying capacity. And we are working, through our programming and influencing work, to shift underlying power dynamics and address inequality. But we still have a long way to go.

Major INGOs holding on tight

Regardless of their charitable mission, INGOs—including Oxfam—are organizations that seek to be successful and sustain themselves. They face enormous pressure to raise funds, so they tend to hold on to direct responsibility for implementation to ensure that they can control how money is spent, and because it is easier to parlay direct implementation to *their* funders as active work with tangible results. Research conducted by Oxfam and other INGOs found:

There are strong pressures to maintain the status quo of the humanitarian sector. . . . A strategic shift toward southern actors is not a neutral one, but will potentially see northern/western humanitarian agencies lose out in terms of resources. Therefore any suggestion of a more localized approach to response is likely to meet with resistance, even if the humanitarian imperatives are clear-cut.[151]

In interviews for this report, experts on humanitarian policy and programs from both OECD and developing countries said the following when asked why they think INGOs have a hard time embracing local leadership:

- "NGOs, like many other international actors, struggle because they are so bound by their brand."[152]
- Voicing the perceived mentality of some INGOs: "Our job is to save lives. We don't have time to sit with partners."[153]
- "To do local capacity building, INGOs have to be able to tolerate failure."[154]

A recent study points out that there simply are not adequate incentives to lead INGOs to relinquish their current dominant position as implementers of humanitarian assistance and as the main conduit for support to local and national NGOs and government entities. INGOs have not conceptualized the business model for supporting and facilitating localization or for their evolving roles.[155]

In some cases, INGOs seem far from embracing a shift in power to local leadership and local humanitarian action. For example, respondents to the CAFOD survey of Southern L/NNGOs reported experiencing exclusionary behavior by international actors that, as perceived by the L/NNGOs, were intentionally displacing and dominating partnership relationships.[156] Also, in the 2000s, US NGOs that implement food aid programming worked to limit local and regional procurement (LRP), fearing this would reduce their resources even though there was strong evidence that LRP would speed up assistance delivery and reduce costs.[157]

"Humanitarian INGOs have started to turn into corporations, self-perpetuating and self-interested."
Expert interviewed by Oxfam, March 2014.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN CRISIS-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

Under international law, states have the primary responsibility to respect, protect, facilitate, and fulfill the rights of their citizens. The UN General Assembly has declared that, in a humanitarian crisis, states have primary responsibility to assist affected people within their respective territories, including initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation. It asserted in the same resolution that where a state's capacity is insufficient, it should seek international assistance.[158]

Although there will always be mega-disasters and large international refugee flows to which no country can reasonably be expected to respond on its own, many governments are capable of responding to small- and medium-scale emergencies and leading the response to large-scale disasters, perhaps with international support. In fact, many governments assume this responsibility on a regular basis. There are many small- and medium-scale disasters from natural hazards that do not make the headlines, where the government leads and manages a response, supported by local and national civil society.[159] An increasing number of countries across the economic spectrum have invested in DRR, preparedness, and response capacity and infrastructure—often following a particularly devastating disaster from a natural hazard or poorly conducted response—and are increasingly insisting on leading responses in their countries, even if they accept some international assistance; these include Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.[160] For example, in December 2014, the Philippine government led preparedness and response activities when Typhoon Ruby/Hagupit struck. This included disseminating early warning messages and evacuating more than a million people.[161] This trend toward local leadership is expected to grow.[162]

However, many other governments are failing to prepare for their own emergencies and thus are not able to conduct appropriate DRR, preparedness, and response activities. Some have the resources at their disposal but do not allocate them appropriately; some respond but do not provide assistance according to need and may even discriminate against certain populations or groups in their response; and some governments are unwilling to act and are contributing to, or even causing, the crisis.

On the other hand, governments in many countries where Oxfam works have the will but not the necessary resources. Many of these countries are at a high risk of climate-related disasters (drought, flooding, etc.) yet their populations have a low level of resilience making them extremely vulnerable.[163] In fact, 81 percent of disaster deaths are in low- and lower-middle-income countries although only 33 percent of disasters occur in those countries.[164] For example, the 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti, the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, killed 200 times as many people as did an earthquake in Chile a few weeks later, even though the latter temblor was 500 times stronger.[165] These are the countries that need and warrant assistance from the international community.

Insufficient investments in humanitarian response

In most countries, domestic spending on humanitarian crises is not reported publicly, making it impossible to study it at a country level or globally. In 2014, Development Initiatives (DI) tracked and then compared domestic and international humanitarian spending in three countries—India, Kenya, and the Philippines—between 2008 and 2012. In both India and the Philippines, domestic spending far outweighed international assistance, whereas Kenya, a country with fewer resources, spent less, both absolutely and as a percentage of its national budget (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9: Average annual domestic and international humanitarian contributions for India, Kenya, and the Philippines, 2008-12

DOMESTIC HUMANITARIAN CONTRIBUTIONS AS A % OF NATIONAL BUDGET

Bold colours
represent volume of domestic
humanitarian expenditure

Lighter shades
represent volume of international
humanitarian assistance

Source: Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 41.[166]

DI also looked at resource flows to the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance over the period 2003-2012, comparing them with developing countries as a whole.[167] The analysis found that for many of the top recipients of humanitarian assistance, government expenditure per capita is low, so oftentimes governments cannot meet the needs of their people. Unfortunately, there is little prospect for expenditure growth in the near term.[168] In such countries, international resources, including humanitarian assistance, are crucial.

DI also found that six of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance have extremely low domestic spending levels of less than $1,000 per capita.[169] In 2012, 35 percent of international humanitarian assistance went to countries in which domestic government spending is under $500 per person per year (e.g., Ethiopia, the DRC, Niger, Mali), and an additional 19 percent went to countries in which domestic government spending is $500-$1,000 per person per year.[170]

These data emphasize the critical nature of international humanitarian assistance to many countries facing crises, particularly entrenched crises.[171] They also suggest that, in many of the top recipients of humanitarian assistance, the government cannot spend more domestic resources on humanitarian action. This shortfall demonstrates the need for international spending to fill the gap and reinforces the importance of effective investments in capacity-strengthening.

Failure to protect citizens and deliver effective and impartial humanitarian assistance

In addition to sufficient domestic funding for humanitarian response, another key issue is whether crisis-affected governments meet the needs and uphold the rights of their citizens and whether they ensure the impartial delivery of assistance. A number of these governments have placed restrictions on civil society, thereby severely constraining citizens' efforts to hold authorities to account. In instances where national governments fail to respond effectively and fairly, international engagement is essential for delivering humanitarian assistance or helping local populations hold the government accountable, or both.

A government's handling of an emergency may depend on the nature of the crisis (conflict versus "natural disaster"); its role in a conflict situation; the affected population's political, ethnic, religious, and other characteristics; the government's desire to appear self-sufficient to the international community; and numerous other

factors. This may be more obvious in conflict settings, such as Darfur or Colombia, but it is equally true in disasters from natural hazards, where there may be residual tensions following a conflict or ongoing discrimination or polarization in the community. It is very unusual for a government response to be completely impartial, especially when marginalized communities have less power to demand that their rights be protected. Disasters always involve power, with power-holders making decisions—at least partly political choices—about the use of limited resources.[172] For example, in the initial aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, 1.5 million Haitians lived in IDP camps, most established spontaneously on private property. Over time, many landlords forcibly evicted IDPs to recover their property. The national government never adopted a policy to uphold the IDPs' rights to shelter and protection, and some local governments actively supported evictions.[173] There are often tensions between the national government and sub-national government entities (e.g., in Myanmar, the Philippines, and India), so even if a government is willing and able to lead a response, it may not allow sub-national government entities or local civil society to lead local-level efforts.[174]

Insufficient investments in DRR and disaster preparedness

There is scant data on national investments in DRR and preparedness. The 168 countries that signed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) on DRR are responsible for submitting data on their investments, but few have provided any, let alone complete, data.[175] DI has looked at DRR investment by the top 40 recipients of humanitarian assistance over the past decade. Only six reported national investments in DRR in 2009-11 as part of the HFA reporting commitments; this could reflect an absence of DRR investments or merely a failure to report.[176]

There is an enormous range in national DRR investments. Some countries invest quite heavily, and in some cases—such as Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Panama, Peru, and the Philippines—national financing of DRR outweighs international DRR funding.[177] At the other end of the range, 100 percent of the Haitian government's DRR budget is in the form of donor assistance tied to particular projects, with NGOs heavily involved in implementation. Members of local disaster management committees (known as "civil protection committees" in Haiti) emphasize that they receive little to no support from the national government; as one of them told us in an interview, "Civil protection is an orphan."[178]

Financial investments in DRR are just one part of the equation of strengthening resilience and reducing the risk of damage from disasters. Comprehensive legal frameworks are needed to ensure coherent national policies, plans, and programs. But a 2013 study by the Asian Development Bank found that only half of the countries in the highly vulnerable Asia-Pacific region had developed national laws on disaster risk management.[179] Effective resilience building also requires mechanisms to identify and monitor disaster risks, establishment of early warning systems, and disaster preparedness and reduction conducted with input from and leadership by women so that they accurately reflect the ways in which crises affect women differently than men.[180]

4 WHAT IS THE CRITICAL WRONG TO RIGHT?

The current global humanitarian system delivers billions of dollars in aid and benefits tens of millions of people annually. Nevertheless, it frequently provides inadequate, inappropriate, and untimely assistance within a context of increasing need and vulnerability. Developing and strengthening humanitarian capacity in countries vulnerable to crisis is a promising way forward to "right the wrong."

Oxfam's current strategic plan recognizes mounting humanitarian need and sets forth a bold challenge to Oxfam itself to work increasingly with others, both states and civil society, to improve the organization's delivery of life saving assistance and protection.[181] This work will be centered on national legal and policy frameworks that provide institutional and financial support to subnational and local governments' emergency preparedness and response activities. Civil society organizations and communities must play a stronger role in collaborating with public sector actors and INGOs in carrying out humanitarian action, reducing vulnerability, increasing disaster preparedness, holding governmental actors at all levels accountable, and ensuring that vulnerable groups (women, children, elderly people, low-income people, ethnic minorities) do not bear a disproportionate share of the effects.

Developing this capacity would allow much more timely humanitarian action, save on costs by integrally linking humanitarian action to effective and well-financed DRR, reduce inappropriate and unneeded aid by increasing use of local knowledge to identify needs, empower citizens and their governments to take the lead in solving their problems, and foster humanitarian responses that are consistently accountable to affected people.

There are many constraints to effective restructuring of the global humanitarian system, including national legislation, risk-averse donors, reporting and accountability mechanisms, donor silos, and the current structure of aid budgets. But the foremost constraint seems to be donors' lack of political will to provide adequate financial resources. It affects not only the creation of sustainable local capacity but also efforts to engage in meaningful reform at the international level.

INADEQUATE, UNBALANCED GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN FINANCING

As noted in Chapter 2, global humanitarian assistance consistently fails to meet needs, with shortfalls in meeting UN humanitarian appeals averaging more than 33 percent for the past 15 years. To some extent, we can attribute these shortfalls to weak economies or as a result of broader cuts to ODA in some major donor countries, such as Spain and Australia, which have been justified by these governments as being due to budgetary problems. However, the problem seems to be mainly due to donors' failure to make humanitarian assistance more of a policy priority. For example, collectively DAC members provided $11.8 billion in humanitarian aid in 2012,[182] but OECD countries' military spending that year totaled $1.2 trillion,[183] or more than 100 times as much. In Syria, Oxfam found that as of early September 2014, donors had provided just 40 percent of the UN humanitarian appeal, with many donors failing to contribute a "fair share" based on their level of national wealth.[184]

The sectoral imbalances in humanitarian assistance reflect the political actions of powerful private interests in donor countries. Notably, the bias toward in-kind food aid in US humanitarian assistance—which distorts humanitarian assistance in general—stems from lobbying campaigns in favor of the status quo by agribusiness, the shipping industry, and NGOs that handle US food aid.[185] Similarly, global health enjoys much stronger lobbies and public support in donor countries than DRR. For instance, although it also addresses urgent international priorities, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria received $2.6 billion in 2010, or more than twice as much funding as DRR.[186] Moreover, from the perspective of a policymaker seeking to justify expenditures to taxpayers, spending that reduces the prevalence of life-threatening diseases generates tangible results that lead directly to economic growth and reduced dependence on aid. Spending that means less need for humanitarian assistance down the road is much more abstract, however real the savings of lives and money may be.

Inadequacies and imbalances in humanitarian financing stem from its voluntary nature. This contrasts sharply with funding for UN peacekeeping operations, which comes from mandatory assessments imposed on UN member states. A voluntary system permits donors to focus only on the emergencies, sectors, and funding modalities that interest them. It heightens the power of domestic interest groups in donor countries to distort assistance priorities.

5 NEW PATHWAYS IN RIGHTING THE WRONG

Building on the discussion of problems with the current humanitarian system, the institutional accountability, and the principal constraints to improving the system, this section draws on Oxfam research to lay out several pathways that will enable the current system to shift—or, rather, turn on its head—toward a more locally led humanitarian system that should save more lives more effectively. The primary pathways include humanitarian action to be locally led whenever possible, with a clear role for international actors; adequate funding to local state and non-state actors; and stronger partnerships between international and local actors, with a greater focus on capacity-strengthening. National governments need to improve their provision of humanitarian assistance before, during, and following crises, both in terms of sufficient resources and impartial delivery. However, this chapter mostly focuses on the pathways for international actors and concludes by sharing Oxfam's approach to the above pathways and plans for future research on the intertwined topics that contribute to this issue.

MORE LOCALLY LED HUMANITARIAN ACTION, WITH CLEAR ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Humanitarian response led by local and national actors (state and civil society) in affected countries is usually preferable to large international responses in a number of ways: It is likely to be faster and better grounded in local realities, and is frequently cheaper, thus will ultimately save more lives. While humanitarian standard-setting bodies such as Sphere, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, and People in Aid have been working on developing a Core Humanitarian Standard that would put communities and people affected by crisis and humanitarian principles at the heart of humanitarian standards,[187] more needs to be done for a power shift to locally led responses, where possible.

Locally led responses are not always possible, though, and international actors should continue to lead in such instances. In essence, the default should be local leadership, as opposed to the present system in which local leadership is usually the exception; it does not appear that international actors conduct any sort of assessment of whether their leadership is necessary.[188]

Varying roles for local and international actors, depending on the situation

Oxfam sees a range of typologies, in which the potential leadership role of national governments and international actors varies depending on the situation (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Potential leadership by national governments in crisis-affected countries and best role for international actors, in various scenarios

SCENARIO	POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP BY NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS	BEST ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Governments with the ca-pacity and will to lead, which are committed to im-partial delivery of humanitari-an as-sistance to all people in the country.	Lead humanitarian efforts in their countries now, with assistance from its own civil society, and international actors should be stepping back.	Provide support as needed and re-quested. In a medium- or large-scale emergency, this may be re-quested, but leadership should re-main local.
Governments that have the will to lead DRR, prepared-ness, and response efforts in their country and are commit-ted to the impartial delivery of assistance, but lack the capacity to lead.	Assume as much responsibility and leadership as possible, including setting the agenda of needs.	Coordinate internationally led humanitarian responses with the national government, while simul-taneously investing in developing governmental capacity to lead future humanitarian responses.
Governments that may have the will to lead humanitarian action and are committed to the impartial delivery of assistance but are mired in protracted crises	Likely not capable of leading the response efforts.	Will likely need to lead the re-sponse, at least in the short-term; do so as needed and requested. In-vest in strengthening the capacity of both state and non-state actors.
Situations in which the gov-ernment is not able to perform basic functions, such as governance, security, and the provision of basic services, let alone lead humanitarian action, across its territory (i.e., failed states)	There is, by definition, little func-tioning capacity to lead. In most situations, the government does not have control over the entire state and thus cannot engage in adequate DRR or preparedness or provide humanitarian assistance, but there may be government ac-tors that are willing to engage.	Assess the degree to which government or other entities are meeting the DRR, preparedness, and response needs. International actors may need to lead humani-tarian assistance efforts, perhaps in certain regions and perhaps across the country. In such instances, jointly design programs with local NGOs, while building their capacity and that of the govern-ment at national and local levels.
Conflicts in which the govern-ment is party to the conflict, and disasters stemming from natural hazards in which the government is not providing impartial assistance to people within its borders	In this situation, the government is shirking its responsibilities to provide adequate, impartial assistance.	Play a much more active role, leading the assistance efforts and holding the government account-able for its conduct. Seek areas of the government with which coop-eration and capacity-strengthen-ing might be possible, and work with and develop civil society's capacity. Direct funding of certain local actors may still be possible. International actors must play a role in ensuring that refugees and IDPs receive protection and assistance.

National governments, which bear the primary responsibility to provide for those in their countries, have the biggest role to play. National governments must prepare for, and respond to, humanitarian emergencies to the best of their abilities. This includes investing funds in building systems and human capabilities. Women should hold key positions within disaster management systems, including in relevant government ministries. Governments must increase investments in DRR and lead emergency responses in their countries, including determining when international assistance is necessary and playing a coordinating and leadership role in those situations.

Local humanitarian leadership does not mean that international actors have no role, as Table 5.1 indicates.

"INGOs should re-examine their role in humanitarian preparedness and response: Are we really committed to capacity-building? What does it mean? In a crisis, instead of launching a big effort, INGOs should try to use local partners as much as possible. We are hearing from local NGOs that what they need is mentoring and skills to do basic finance, reporting, and research, and not just workshops. They want experienced INGO staff to be working alongside them as mentors and coaches."

Jemilah Mahmood, Chief of the World Humanitarian Summit secretariat; founder and former president of Mercy Malaysia (written correspondence with the authors, July 2015).

ADEQUATE FUNDING TO LOCAL ACTORS

Although many aspects of the international system and national governments' delivery of humanitarian assistance do not strengthen local leadership and capacity, the primary constraint is inadequate funding in general and direct funding for local actors.

Developing a mandatory funding scheme for international humanitarian assistance could address the first problem of funding for humanitarian response generally. A percentage of the funds could be set aside for developing humanitarian capacity in crisis-prone countries. The level of funding that such a system would make available would likely not cover all of the needs generated by large-scale, rapid-onset emergencies. (These are the emergencies most likely to attract voluntary contributions.) The mandatory funding could cover minimum and predictable levels of need for humanitarian assistance and capacity development, with additional voluntary contributions still necessary in many years. An alternative to funding humanitarian assistance and capacity development through assessments imposed on UN member states could be dedicating revenues raised from a mandatory tax on global currency or financial transactions. This would be similar to the Tobin Tax[189] or Robin Hood Tax.[190] These ideas require further investigation in order to determine if any might be feasible. Not only does the humanitarian system require more funding but the balance of the funding should also shift so that donors and current primary recipients are giving a far greater share of funding directly to local actors. Along the lines of the Hyogo and Sendai DRR frameworks, the DAC members and other key actors in the system—including relevant UN agencies, INGOs, and the Red Cross movement—should make commitments to direct a certain percentage of their humanitarian assistance funding to state and non-state actors in crisis-affected countries.[191]

One element of increased funding for local actors is the need for far greater transparency from all international actors regarding the funding they pass to local actors. Donors should improve transparency and accountability with better reporting to the DAC and OCHA. INGOs, UN agencies, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement all should track and publicize data on the funding they give to national- and local-level partners, including the share that goes to core funding as opposed to programming and the share that goes to local NGOs that focus on women's rights, or are led by women, or both.

Government donors as well as UN agencies and INGOs should reassess their risk management strategies to determine if some adjustments are possible to increase direct funding of local and national NGOs and governments and to loosen the eligibility

and reporting requirements tied to such funding. Leading humanitarian actors should strive to provide partners with multi-year funding[192] and minimize the hoops through which a recipient must jump. All donors should increase the core funding provided to local actors, including payment of overhead costs, which donors already cover for international actors. Funding of local humanitarian actors in all crises, including protracted and recurrent crises, should more closely resemble funding of development partners, in that it should conform to an extended timeframe. Most INGOs rely on the short-term funding available during an emergency to engage with humanitarian partners, but once the money is spent the partnership and support for the partners' capacity often dissolves.

There are some new, more flexible NGO-led pooled funds, such as the Start Network in the United Kingdom (Box 5.1), the RAPID Fund created by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in Pakistan,[193] and country-based funds in South Sudan and Darfur, Sudan,[194] that aim to disburse funds quickly and largely to local actors. The Sudan and Pakistan funds prioritize disbursing small grants directly to LNGOs and community groups. These may represent a new trend in funding options.[195]

Box 5.1: START Network

The Start Network officially launched in April 2014 with $3 million in funding from DFID and additional support from Irish Aid. It is composed of 24 INGOs, including Oxfam. The Start Fund focuses on filling gaps in emergency funding, particularly in small-to-medium-scale emergencies, and the Start Build focuses on strengthening civil society capacity in crisis-affected countries.

The predecessor to the Start Network was the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) Emergency Response Fund, which was created by a group of 15 British NGOs in 2010, also with funding from DFID, with the mission of strengthening the coordination and capacity of the NGO sector to deliver appropriate, high-quality, and timelier humanitarian assistance. The CBHA channeled over half of all its grants to local partner organizations. A 2012 evaluation of the CBHA concluded that the fund was "so successful that it could well serve as a model for an NGO equivalent to the UN's CERF."[196]

Sources: www.start-network.org; Lydia Poole, "The CBHA Early Response Fund (ERF)" (March 2012);[197] IRIN, "NGOs Look to a New Humanitarian Funding Model" (Nov. 6, 2013); Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014*, 66.

BETTER PARTNERSHIPS AND CAPACITY-STRENGTHENING

More balanced partnerships between international and local actors require respect and trust.[198] They also feature:

- International actors enabling, supporting, and helping national and local institutions to reduce risk, prepare for crises, and respond to them, rather than directing local organizations to carry out the international actors' plans as contractors.

- International actors partnering with local actors with a focus on gender and women's issues, including gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, and transactional sex to obtain humanitarian assistance, to engage women in all aspects of emergency preparedness and response to ensure that capacity-strengthening efforts rest on sound gender analysis,

- Local partner engagement in the process of identifying needs in terms of DRR, disaster preparedness, and humanitarian response; prioritizing efforts; and ensuring adequate but not redundant coverage of humanitarian actors and programs.

- International actors giving decision-making power to local partners in international fora such as UN humanitarian coordination structures, so that these include more meaningful representation of local and national actors.

Better capacity-strengthening

Although there is an entire body of literature on capacity-strengthening within the development sector,[199] the humanitarian sector has generally not conducted sufficient monitoring, evaluation, and learning on capacity-strengthening initiatives. So it is difficult to make definitive judgments on the impact of strengthening local humanitarian capacity.[200]

That said, there is evidence that strengthening local capacity has led to a more efficient response and most importantly more lives saved. For example, in **Bangladesh**, the frequency and high loss of life experienced during disasters from 1971 to the early 1990s led the government to enact an extensive legal and policy framework that defined the roles and responsibilities of agencies in crises at all levels of government. With financial support from donors, the government invested substantial national resources in DRR, including building a network of cyclone shelters and early warning systems. Bangladeshi NGOs engaged in preparedness and response activities, and INGOs provided capacity-strengthening support at the local level. As a result of these investments, the country has dramatically reduced casualties due to floods and cyclones.[201] In 1970, the Bhola cyclone killed over 500,000 people. By 2007, when the much higher intensity Cyclone Sidr struck, the death toll was 3,300, or less than 1 percent of that of 1970.

Over the past 10 years, Oxfam has received multiple grants from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for emergency response and DRR programs, including capacity-strengthening of partners, in **Central America**. Oxfam has also invested unrestricted income in humanitarian capacity development, working with a number of partners. These include Concertación Regional de Gestión de Riesgos (CRGR), a four-country regional organization aimed at increasing the capacity of vulnerable communities to prepare for and respond to disasters. In a demonstration of the commitment of Oxfam and its partners to effective capacity strengthening, in 2012, the Gates Foundation awarded $1.6 million directly to CRGR.[202]

In **Mozambique**, a country prone to cyclones, floods, and other natural hazards, Oxfam implemented a comprehensive Humanitarian Capacity Building program involving: 1) identifying potential partners, 2) analyzing their technical and organizational capacity, 3) proposing and agreeing to tailored capacity development plans with the national NGOs, 4) implementing those plans with national NGOs, and 5) promoting synergies and coordination among the partners. The approach focused on reinforcing local capacities with a long-term, comprehensive perspective on national problems, vulnerability mapping, and scoping out potential partners. Oxfam also promoted the role of local NGOs in the international humanitarian mechanisms operating within Mozambique. Successes included increased technical humanitarian competencies of the partners and greater engagement of the partners among themselves, other humanitarian actors, and international actors.[203]

"The danger of a lot of the capacity-strengthening is that it could build 'mini me's' [Northern-style organizations]. But that's not what we set out to do."

Paul Knox-Clarke, ALNAP (interview, March 2014).

Best practices in capacity-strengthening

The literature identifying best practices and lessons learned in successful capacity-strengthening is thin. Nonetheless, from the work of Oxfam and other INGOs and interviews with thought leaders and local civil society members, we conclude that capacity-strengthening efforts work best in close collaboration with local actors; are tailored, yet flexible, to fit a changing local context; invest the time and funding needed; use active-learning methods for trainings, such as secondments or simulation exercises, rather than traditional face-to-face classroom lectures and PowerPoint presentations; include comprehensive support and trainings on disaster management principles, coordination mechanisms, global financial and regulatory systems, organizational financial and human resources systems, and monitoring, evaluation and learning; and include training on gender justice, international humanitarian and human rights law, and humanitarian principles and standards. Capacity-strengthening does not need to be conducted North-South; South-South initiatives, particularly conducted by people speaking the same language or from similar cultures, can be equally or more effective. For example, Oxfam partners from El Salvador have helped strengthen staff and partner capacity in Haiti, and Oxfam Haiti staff subsequently went to Senegal to conduct trainings.

OXFAM'S APPROACH TO PARTNERSHIPS AND CAPACITY-STRENGTHENING

Oxfam is endeavoring both to work increasingly with local NGO partners and government actors and to strengthen the quality of those partnerships while helping to develop partners' capacity. Some Oxfam affiliates, such as Oxfam Novib in the Netherlands and Oxfam Australia, have predominantly focused their humanitarian programs in this way for many years. In addition to the substantial indirect support that Oxfam gives to its partners, through trainings and secondments for example, Oxfam provided an average of 24 percent of its annual humanitarian spending directly to local actors over the past three years.[204]

Moreover, Oxfam is committed to ensuring that its partners have a voice and a decision-making role in all stages of programming: needs assessment, program design and implementation, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning. Oxfam is committed to building capacity *with*, rather than forcing it *upon*, governmental and non-governmental partners. The capacity is not only technical, but also organizational (e.g., developing financial and human resources systems), focused on the short- and long-term sustainability and growth of the partner. We are mindful that shifting the humanitarian system in this way is not merely about a transfer of technical responsibilities, or building technical capacity. It will require, above all, a shift in power dynamics. As an INGO, Oxfam is in a position to try to shift the power dynamics at the global level, but we must also support our partners so that they can shift the power dynamics within their own countries.

"Oxfam has strengthened our organization. You have built our capacity in finance, logistics, programs, report-writing, strategic planning, and more. Now, people can see that we are working to an international standard, so we are able to engage new international partners, [including INGOs] and several UN agencies."
Logistics Officer for Oxfam local partner organization in Darfur, Sudan, interview with Oxfam Staff, March 2015.

CONCLUSION

Humanitarian crises will continue to occur, resulting in loss of life and livelihoods and immense damage. In fact, it is projected that disasters from natural hazards will increase in both frequency and severity, and conflicts may follow suit. The international humanitarian system created decades ago has saved thousands and thousands of lives. Humanitarian aid workers have worked bravely and tirelessly, against enormous and increasing challenges, and with relatively few resources. Their accomplishments are irrefutable. Yet we should try to do better.

If we were to create a new global humanitarian system today, we believe national governments should be at the center, supported and held to account by their own civil societies, with international actors standing by to assist whenever necessary. In fact, local responders tackle crises regularly, leading efforts that never reach the Western media. Yet the standard operating procedure remains internationally led action, without systematically assessment of local actors' capacity to lead effective humanitarian responses. The current system can feel intractable, with the entrenched power of the main actors and the systems that reinforce this power, but we must strive to move toward a more effective, efficient, and equitable system. We can do this by a) increasing the humanitarian funding to governments and civil society in affected countries, b) strengthening civil society's technical, institutional, and leadership capacity and their capacity to hold their governments to account, through strong partnerships with international actors, and c) shifting the leadership role in DRR, humanitarian preparedness and response to local actors whenever possible.

NOTES

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7   OCHA and DARA, Saving Lives Today and Tomorrow: Managing the Risk of Humanitarian Crises (New York: UN, 2014); see also Jan Kellett and Alice Caravani, Financing Disaster Risk Reduction: A 20 Year Story of International Aid (London: Overseas Development Institute and Washington: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2013); Jan Kellett and Dan Sparks Disaster Risk Reduction: Spending Where it Should Count (Somerset, UK: Development Initiatives, 2012); Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014 (Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives, 2014).

8   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), "Summary for Policymakers," in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Christopher B. Field et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 11-13.

9   IRIN, "Preparing for Urban Disasters—Challenges and Recommendations," January 10, 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/97199/preparing-for-urban-disasters-challenges-and-recommendations.

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11 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a group of the largest government aid donors. There are currently 29 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. Turkey is a member of the OECD and has observer status in the DAC but has not sought full membership. See http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm.

12 See, for example, United Nations and World Bank, Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention (Washington: World Bank, 2010).

13 See Kimberly Howe, Elizabeth Stites, and Danya Chudacoff, Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2015), 31-33, http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Breaking-the-Hourglass_Syria_Iraqi-Kurdistan.pdf, for discussion of definition of capacity and what aspects have priority for international versus local actors,

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17 Calculated using data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service database (OCHA FTS), http://fts.unocha.org/. There are problems with using UN appeals as a proxy for humanitarian needs, as they do not necessarily reflect the results of rigorous assessments and are issued only if external assistance is requested. Nevertheless, they are the broadest measure available. As Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014 notes, there are multiple initiatives underway to improve the quality of needs assessment.

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24 Karen A. Grépin and Amanda Glassman, "Funding To Fight Ebola: Not Too Little, But Definitely Too Late," February 4, 2015, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/funding-fight-ebola-not-too-little-definitely-too-late. According to a recent study published in the British Medical Journal, "Like the international response, contributions to fight the epidemic were slow to take off." Further, only about one third of the pledged funding had been disbursed to affected countries as of February 2015. See Karen A. Grépin, "International Donations to the Ebola Virus Outbreak: Too Little, Too Late?" British Medical Journal 350 (2015), http://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h376. In a talk at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in February 2015, Liberian assistant minister of health Tolbert Nyenswah said of the international response, "The world came late, but when it came, it came very big"; see http://csis.org/event/ebola-liberia-conversation-tolbert-nyenswah-0. See also Stimson Center, "UN Ebola Intervention: A New Beginning for International Emergency Response," December 23, 2014, http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/un-ebola-intervention-a-new-beginning-for-international-emergency-response/ ("One of the main reasons that the international response came so late was the lack of a cohesive response strategy and a coordination mechanism between the numerous actors and stakeholders").

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28 See https://www.iccat.int/en/finances.htm. The authors are grateful to John Powell, former Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme, for pointing this out.

29 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014.

30 Ibid.; Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013.

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32 INTRAC, "Support to Civil Society: Emerging Evaluation Lessons," Evaluation Insights 8 (Paris: OECD, 2013), 3.

33 Humanitarian Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1996R1257:20090420:EN:PDF, Article 7.1; European Commission, "General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2013," Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2012) 405 final, November 27, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/strategy/strategy_2013_en.pdf.

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35 Such variation may not reflect the reality of donor official development assistance (ODA) financing but may instead be the product of OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (DAC CRS) reporting as the detailed codes for channel of delivery, including specifying aid going to recipient government and local NGOs, were not consistently applied for data prior to FY2010. Therefore, caution is advised when using and analysing DAC CRS data for the years before 2010, since any aid variation may not be attributable to government donors' funding choices. Also, there was a big jump in total ODA in 2010, driven by extraordinary debt relief; see OECD Development Co-operation Report 2011 (Paris: OECD, 2011).

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37 Scoping interview: Sara Pantuliano, Overseas Development Institute (March 2014).

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43   ALNAP State of the Humanitarian System, 71-72; scoping interview: Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian Outcomes (May 2014).

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76 Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, Missed Opportunities, 22.

77 Ibid., 11, 15; Poole, Funding, 8.

78 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, "Accountability to Affected Persons Operational Framework," https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/AAP%20Operational%20Framework%20Final%20Revision.pdf

79 Joel Charny, personal communication with the authors (September 2014).

80 Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, Missed Opportunities, 11, 15, referring to the principle of subsidiarity.

81 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 52; Asbjørn Eide, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right: Final Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (1987), 67-69.

82 Sara Pantuliano, personal communication with the authors (February 2015). ALNAP, State of the Humanitarian System 2012, 80 notes that in the response to drought in Kenya in 2011, there was "interference throughout, affecting contracting, recruitment and the manipulation of targeting and distribution processes."

83 Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, Missed Opportunities, 20.

84 Ibid., 18; scoping interviews: Dyan Mazurana, Tufts University (February 2014) (nine out of 10 local groups will fail); Peter Walker, Chatham University (then with Tufts University) (February 2014); Kimberly Howe, Tufts University (February 2014) (Syria, northern Iraq); Sara Pantuliano (scaling up is biggest challenge).

85 Pete Ewins et al., "Mapping the Risks of Corruption in Humanitarian Action," Report for Transparency International and the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, July 2006, 12 ("Whether international organisations are better able to minimise corruption remains unclear in part because a reluctance to discuss or analyse corruption risks in relief means that there is little or no comparative evidence or analysis on which to draw."), http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/874.pdf.

86 Barnaby Willitts-King and Paul Harvey, Managing the Risks of Corruption in Humanitarian Relief Operations (prepared for DFID, March 2005), http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1977.pdf, 10 ("There is . . . a need for caution in assuming that international aid agencies are necessarily less corrupt than local actors….").

87 Scoping interview: Jemilah Mahmood, Chief of the World Humanitarian Summit secretariat, founder and former president of Mercy Malaysia (then with the Humanitarian Futures Programme, Kings College London) (April 2014).

88 Scoping interview: Kimberly Howe (Syria and Turkey-Syria cross-border assistance). A recent Transparency International handbook on preventing corruption in humanitarian operations does not specifically address the comparative levels of corruption in internationally versus locally led humanitarian action; see Transparency International, Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations (Berlin: TI, 2014), http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/preventing_corruption_in_humanitarian_operations. This publication does find increased risk of corruption in remote management situations "in high-risk environments involving poor security or conflict," recommending as a preventative measure the investment in local staff and partners' capacity in transparency and accountability, addressing corruption risks. Ibid., 23, 138. Interestingly, the report finds that, in remote management situations, handing program management to local partners "may increase corruption risks or it may strengthen local ownership and programme impact." Ibid., 139.

89 Oxfam America, "To Fight Corruption, Localize Aid: How US foreign Assistance Can Support a Locally Driven Fight Against Corruption," Oxfam Research Report (Boston: OA, 2015).

90 See The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and International Committee of the Red Cross, 1995), http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I259EN.pdf

91 Many experts believe that it is international actors who today often compromise them. Scoping interviews: Peter Walker; Antonio Donini, Tufts University (February 2014); Sara Pantuliano, quoting a senior official from a non-traditional humanitarian agency ("We need to drop the copyright on the principles"); Katherine Nightingale, Christian Aid (March 2014). Moreover, The UN-led Cluster System, which coordinates international humanitarian action, can undercut the impartiality of assistance, as INGOs may be financially dependent on the organizations that lead the clusters, and these lead organizations are often part of or maintain close relationships with UN-integrated missions that combine political, peacekeeping, and humanitarian elements, peacekeeping forces, or actors involved in conflicts. ALNAP, State of the Humanitarian System 2012, 80.

92 Scoping interviews: Peter Walker; Katherine Nightingale ("If we [INGOs] can be there [in complex/conflict environments], we can be there working with partners—in partnerships or accompaniment. There might just need to be a greater degree of accompaniment and accountability").

93 Scoping interviews: Dyan Mazurana; Kimberly Howe (Syria); Sara Pantuliano (example of women in eastern Sudan pushing gender issues onto the agenda); Juliano Fiori, Save the Children (March 2014).

94 Ann Witteveen (humanitarian director, Oxfam Canada), email message to authors (January 2015). For example, in the Ebola response in Sierra Leone, which was led by the Ministry of Defense, Oxfam found that most decision makers were male and tended to base their interventions on male experiences. In fact, 70 percent of the decision makers at the national and district levels were male. When asked about the value of having a stand-alone gender plan in the Ebola response, all 25 of the males argued against it, whereas all 11 females argued for the need to have targeted actions to address women's particular needs. Fatmatta Taqi, Rapid Gender Assessment Report of the Ebola Response on Oxfam Sierra Leone's Operational Areas, internal document (Oxfam Sierra Leone, 2015).

95 Healy and Tiller take INGOs to task for the fact that many ""are now working at arm's length through local NGOs or government authorities, acting more as technical experts, intermediaries, or donors than field actors"). Sean Healy and Sandrine Tiller, Where Is Everyone? Responding to Emergencies in the Most Difficult Places (London: Médecins Sans Frontières, 2014), 4. They also state that local NGOs "have enormous burdens placed on them to respond, but often do not have the skills and experience required to conduct technically difficult interventions; further, it can be difficult for them to operate in contested areas and to be seen as neutral and impartial"). Ibid.; scoping interview: Sandrine Tiller, MSF (May 2014).

96 Howe, Stites, and Chudacoff, Breaking the Hourglass, 16; Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Katherine Haver, Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations," HPG Report 23 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006), 38.

97 Michael Barnett and Peter Walker, "Regime Change for Humanitarian Aid: How to Make Relief More Accountable," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2015): 130-141.

98 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014. The other major category of donor is private funding, which represented $4.1 Billion, or 24 percent of the total in humanitarian funding in 2012. Ibid., 57.

99 Ibid., 26 and Figure 3.1.

100 ALNAP, State of the Humanitarian System 2012, 28.

101 Ibid., 29, note 7. ALNAP considered CRS, CAFOD and other members of Caritas International separately.

102 Ibid., 29 and Figure 6.

103 Ibid., 28, Table 2.

104 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 58.

105 Humanitarian Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1996R1257:20090420:EN:PDF.

106 Start Network, "How Can Donor Requirements Be Reformed To Better Support Efforts To Strengthen Local Humanitarian Capacity?" (Discussion paper for DFID-NGO Forum, September 2014), 2; scoping interview: Peter Walker (offering SIDA as an example).

107 Start Network, "Donor Requirements," 4; World Humanitarian Summit secretariat, Preparatory Stakeholder Analysis, 21 (reporting local organizations' difficulty engaging with donors).

108 Poole, Funding, 23.

109 Ibid., 4, 13-14. One hundred ninety five representatives of national NGOs from 43 countries took part in the online survey.

110 The pilot countries are Lebanon, the Philippines, Ukraine, Kenya, and Guatemala. The US Department of State has already begun implementation of its parallel system, the Risk Analysis and Management System, in the same countries, and both State and USAID are carrying out separate embassy-led vetting programs in other "frontline" countries. USAID, "Partner Vetting in USAID Acquisitions," 77 Fed Reg. 8166 (February 14, 2012), 8166-74; Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, Harvard Law School, Partner Vetting in Humanitarian Assistance: An Overview of Pilot USAID and State Department Programs (Research and Policy Paper, November 2013).

111 Raymond Offenheiser, Oxfam America, Letter to Michael Gushue, USAID, "Comments in Response to USAID Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: 'Partner Vetting in USAID Assistance,' 78 Fed. Reg. 53375 (August 29, 2013) RIN 0412-AA71," December 5, 2013.

112 Poole, Funding; DFID, "Helping Countries Protect Themselves Against Future Disasters," (2013), 15, https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/helping-developing-countries-deal-with-humanitarian-emergencies/supporting-pages/helping-countries-protect-themselves-against-future-disasters.

113 Poole, Funding, 16.

114 Although DRR is often considered part of disaster preparedness on the humanitarian crisis spectrum, it is intended to lower the risk of crises and increase resilience of population so they can better withstand shocks, whereas preparedness is focused on making emergency response more effective.

115 Venton, The Economics of Early Response and Resilience, 17.

116 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 70.

117 Ibid., 78, Figure 6.9 (based on DAC CRS data). Looking beyond the top DAC donors, DI examined DAC donor spending on DRR and preparedness over the period 2006-2010, adding in imputed contributions to DRR and preparedness spending via multilateral organizations. Only Japan and Korea met the 10 percent goal. Dan Sparks, "Aid Investments in Disaster Risk Reduction—Rhetoric to Action," Global Humanitarian Assistance Briefing Paper (Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives, 2012), 9-11, Figure 4.

118 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 78, Figure 6.9.

119 Oxfam et al., "Risk of Relapse—Call to Action: Somalia Crisis Update," July 2014, https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/risk_of_relapse_-_call_to_action_-_somalia_crisis_update_july_-_2014.pdf.

120 USAID, "The Resilience Agenda," http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Briefer_USAID%27s%20Resilience%20Agenda_Dec%202012.pdf.

121 See OCHA, "Cluster Coordination," http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination, for more detail on this system.

122 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 59.

123 Ibid.

124 WFP, WFP's Operational Relationship with NGOs and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies—Annual Report 2011 (Rome: WFP, 2011), http://www.wfp.org/content/wfps-operational-relationship-ngos-annual-report-2011.

125 Finding from authors' field research in Ethiopia, 2005-2010.

126 See also Poole, Funding, 27. WFP and FAO do not currently have this information on funding recipients, because decision-making and record-keeping responsibilities are held at the country-office level, and headquarters do not request this information. UNICEF has recently rolled out a new finance management system that should make tracking this information possible, but it has yet to be made publicly available. Another obstacle to accurate reporting is the fact that few UN agencies make consistent administrative distinctions between national and international partners. Ibid.

127 Eva Svoboda et al., Islamic Humanitarianism? The Evolving Role of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation in Somalia and Beyond (London: ODI, 2015), http://www.odi.org/publications/9218-oic-organisation-islamic-cooperation-somalia-al-shaabab-negotiations-access-coordination.

128 Lilianne Fan and Hanna Krebs, Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action: The Case of ASEAN (London: ODI, 2014), http://www.odi.org/publications/8904-asean-regional-humanitarian-asia-myanmar-rakhine-nargis-philippines-haiyan-yolanda. Also operating in Asia is the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation's Disaster Management Centre.

129 Sara Pantuliano, personal communication with the authors (February 2015).

130 E.g., the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction; see http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/4038. The Facilitating Organisational Responsiveness for Effective West African Risk Reduction (FOREWARN) Initiative is a partnership among ECOWAS, DARA, and the African Leadership Centre at King's College London; see http://www.humanitarianfutures.org/projects/forewarn/?view=overview.

131 Elizabeth Ferris and Daniel Petz, In the Neighborhood: The Growing Role of Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Management (Washington: Brookings Institution–London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/02/regional-organizations-disasters-ferris/regional_disaster_mechanisms_2013.pdf (providing some basic information about the work of more than 30 regional organizations involved in disaster risk management and drawing some comparisons and generalizations about the work of 13 of these organizations through the use of 17 indicators of effectiveness); Stacey White, No Room To Fake It: The Role of Regional Organizations in Building the DRM Capacities of Pacific Island Countries (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/02/06-drm-pacific-islands-climate-white; Elizabeth Ferris, "Where, Oh Where, Do Regional Organizations Fit in the International Humanitarian System?," 17 April 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/04/17-regional-humanitarian-systems-ferris (outlining primary opportunities for regional organizations in setting regional standards on internal displacement, stimulating development of national laws to facilitate disaster assistance, bringing together different regional networks); Steven A. Zyck and Lilianne Fan, "Why the Humanitarian Community Needs To Take Regional Organisations Seriously," 26 February 2015, http://www.odi.org/comment/9287-regional-organisations-humanitarian-aid-response. Because DRR is context-specific and rooted in regional commitments and processes, regional organizations do engage, and have the potential to contribute further, on this issue; see Steven A. Zyck, "Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action," HPG Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2013), http://www.odi.org/publications/8035-regional-organisations-humanitarian-action-steven-zyck.

132 Ferris, "Where, Oh Where" ("Were I to design the international humanitarian system from scratch, I would make regional organizations central actors. Although there are always political sensitivities in intra-regional dynamics, the fact is that regional bodies are closer to affected communities, often share histories, language, and culture with countries in the region, and their work costs less than international organizations with headquarters in Europe and North America").

133 Randolph Kent, Justin Armstrong, and Alice Obrecht, "The Future of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Humanitarian Sector: Global Transformations and their Consequences," Humanitarian Futures Programme Discussion Paper for the Start Network (London: Humanitarian Futures Programme, King's College, 2013), 6, 17, http://www.humanitarianfutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/The-Future-of-Humanitarian-NGOs-HFP-Discussion-Paper-Aug2013.pdf.

134 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 37 ("Many are moving beyond a direct donorship role towards a 'corporate partnership' approach, providing a range of skills and resources whose financial value is unknown"). See also "Stormy Weather: A Terrible Catastrophe in the Philippines Also Wreaks Political and Diplomatic Damage," The Economist, 23 November 2013; Hendri Yuzal and Muamar Vebry, "Past Lessons for Haiyan Recovery," East Asia Forum, 21 January 2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/01/21/past-lessons-for-haiyan-recovery/.

135 Zyck and Fan, "Why the Humanitarian Community Needs to Take Regional Organisations Seriously"; Zyck, "Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action"; Ferris, "Where, Oh Where" ("[P]resently, most regional organizations are relatively weak"); scoping interviews: Sara Pantuliano; Alice Obrecht, ALNAP (then with Humanitarian Futures Program, King's College London) (March 2014) (regarding ECOWAS); Jemilah Mahmood (regarding AHA Centre, and saying that the expectations are too high for it, considering how new it is).

136 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 5.

137 Ibid., 23.

138 See http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/; https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/mandate.

139 See http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/.

140 IFRC and UN Development Programme, Effective Law and Regulation for Disaster Risk Reduction: A Multi-Country Report (Geneva: IFRC and New York: UNDP, 2014), http://www.drr-law.org/resources/drr-full-report.pdf.

141 Poole, Funding, 19, Figure 5.

142 ALNAP, State of the Humanitarian System 2012, 71. This report was based on a literature review, series of key informant interviews, field studies, and three global surveys of a total of 631 humanitarian actors and stakeholders from 183 named organizations in 75 countries. Ibid., 17-20.

143 Poole, Funding, 4.

144 Ibid., 16.

145 Nightingale, Building the Future of Humanitarian Aid, 2. See also Dayna Brown, Antonio Donini, and Paul Knox-Clarke, "Engagement of Crisis-Affected People in Humanitarian Action," Background Paper for ALNAP's 29th Annual Meeting, March 11-12, 2014, 6, http://www.alnap.org/resource/10439.

146 Scoping interview: Katherine Nightingale.

147 Scoping interview: Eugenia Piza-Lopez, UNDP (April 2014).

148 Ibid.

149 See, for example, Hugh Goyder, "Tearfund UK and Tear NL: Evaluation of DEC-funded Shelter Projects Following the 2009 Indonesian Earthquake," August 2010, http://tilz.tearfund.org/~/media/Files/TILZ/Topics/DMT/2010%20Evaluations/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Tearfund%20and%20Tear%20Netherlands%20DEC%20Indonesia%20Evaluation1.pdf; François Grünewald and Andrea Binder, Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute and La Fonaine des Marins, France: Groupe Urgence, Réhabilitation, Développement, 2010), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Haiti_IA_RTE_1_final_report_en.pdf; Julia Steets et al., Cluster Approach Evaluation 2: Synthesis Report (Paris and Berlin: Groupe URD and Global Public Policy Institute, 2010); Houghton, "The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition."

150 Nicklas Svensson, Hannes Berts, and Jens Schjörlien, "Organisational Assessments of Civil Society Organisations (CSO) in View of Possible Qualification as Sida's Framework and/or Strategic Partner Organisations," final report for the Norwegian Refugee Council, 10 October 2013, http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9180065.pdf, 6 ("NRC does not enter into partnerships primarily for the sake of supporting or strengthening local organisations"), 12 ("NRC is primarily a self-implementing organisation, working through a large number of field offices around the world. There are cases where NRC enters into partnerships to strengthen the fulfillment of humanitarian objectives, or to sub-contract implementation in situations where other organisations are better positioned to deliver humanitarian services, but NRC does not have any sub-granting agreements or a specific capacity building mission").

151 Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, Missed Opportunities, 25.

152 Scoping interview: Jemilah Mahmood.

153 Scoping interview: John Borton, ODI/Humanitarian Policy Group (March 2014).

154 Scoping interviews: Peter Walker; Eugenia Piza-Lopez; John Borton; Terry Cannon, Institute of Development Studies (March 2014).

155 Ramalingam and Mitchell, "Responding to Changing Needs," 31 ("[T]here are still major tensions among international agencies about relinquishing control of the humanitarian delivery system . . . . Despite a few stand-out examples, the collaborative model [featuring collaboration between international and national or local actors, with local and national actors responsible for coordination, management and delivery] is evident in those instances where it should have happened but didn't, because of the resistance of international agencies to moving away from standard operating procedures").

156 Poole, Funding, 15.

157 Jennifer Clapp, Hunger in the Balance: The New Politics of International Food Aid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

158 UN General Assembly, Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, GA Resolution 46/182, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., 78th plenary meeting, Annex, I.4, UN Doc A/RES/46/182 (1991); the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (Reports of the Special Rapporteur).

159 Scoping interviews: Marcus Oxley, Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster Reduction (April 2014); Nan Buzard (particularly in response to small- and medium-size crises in Latin America and parts of Asia).

160 Luz Saavedra and Paul Knox-Clarke, Working together in the field for more effective humanitarian response, ALNAP Working Paper (London: ALNAP/ODI, 2015), 27 (referring to Ethiopia, Pakistan, Philippines).

161 Kate Hodal, "Typhoon Hagupit: At Least Three Dead and a Million Evacuated in Philippines," Guardian, 7 December 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/07/typhoon-hagupit-three-dead-million-evacuated-philippines.

162 Kent, Armstrong, and Obrecht, The Future of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Humanitarian Sector, 6 ("Who interprets what is needed for humanitarian response and how it is to be provided will be one clear demonstration of a resurgence of sovereignty. Governments will be more inclined to resist unwelcome though well-intentioned external intervention, and will also be more insistent on determining whether or not external assistance is required and, if so, what will be provided, by whom, when, where, and how.").

163 Kellett and Sparks, Disaster Risk Reduction, 18 ("The poorer a country is, the more significant the impact of natural disaster. Over the 11 years from 2000 to 2010, the proportion of disasters from natural hazards in developing countries occurring in those with the lowest incomes [low-income and least developed countries] has been relatively constant at 40–50 percent. However, the proportion of people affected in these same two poorest country categories was higher in all but two of the 11 years. In some years, such as 2003, 2005 and 2007, the proportion of people affected was 25 percent higher than the proportion of disasters").

164 Debbie Hillier and Gina E. Castillo, "No Accident: Resilience and the Inequality of Risk," Oxfam Briefing Paper 172 (Oxford: Oxfam, 2013), http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/no-accident-resilience-and-the-inequality-of-risk-292353; UN Development Programme, UN Children's Fund, Oxfam, and Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction, "Disaster Risk Reduction Makes Development Sustainable," January 2014, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/UNDP_CPR_CTA_20140901.pdf.

165 Anthony Reuben, "Why Did Fewer Die in Chile's Earthquake than in Haiti's?," BBC News, 1 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8543324.stm (arguing that Chile's relative prosperity meant that buildings in general were better built, and Chile was also able to invest more in preparedness).

166 Philippines data represent an annual average for 2009–2012. Domestic figures include all domestic DRR-related funding, whereas international humanitarian assistance figures include only DRR reported as humanitarian.

167 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 91-97. The data include 17 of the top 20 recipients, as data from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Somalia, and Syria were excluded due to data limitations. Ibid., 92.

168 Ibid., 91.

169 Ibid., 93.

170 Ibid., 89. Given the nexus among long-term crisis, poverty, and limited domestic capacity, it is not surprising that these percentages are even higher for long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance. Ibid.

171 Ibid., 7. All dollar figures in this paragraph are adjusted for purchasing power parity.

172 Scoping interviews: Paul Knox-Clarke, ALNAP (March 2014); Nigel Timmins, Oxfam (March 2014); Juliano Fiori.

173 Hérold Toussaint, "Salt in the Wound," Oxfam Briefing Note, 10 December 2012, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa4/Salt-in-the-wound.pdf.

174 Sara Pantuliano, personal communication with the authors (February 2015); scoping interview: Ben Wisner, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University (April 2014).

175 Kellett and Sparks, Disaster Risk Reduction, 20.

176 Ibid., 22.

177 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 42-44, (India, the Philippines, and Kenya); UN and World Bank, Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters, 105-140 (Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, and Nepal).

178 Authors' interviews of Haitian disaster management officials, DRR experts, and local civil protection committee members, March 2014; Government of the Republic of Haiti, National Directorate of Civil Protection, Ministry of the Interior, Local Government, and National Security, Rapport national de suivi sur la mise en oeuvre du Cadre d'action de Hyogo (2011-2013) (Port-au-Prince: Directorate of Civil Protection, 2013), http://www.preventionweb.net/files/32820_hti_NationalHFAprogress_20-13.pdf.; République d'Haïti, Système National De Gestion Du Risque: Plan national de réponse aux urgences (PNRU) (Port-au-Prince: Ministry of Interior, 2001), http://www.preventionweb.net/files/30709_788fr1.pdf..

179 Mikio Ishiwatari, Disaster Risk Management at the National Level, ADBI Working Paper 448 (Manila: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2013), http://www.adbi.org/files/2013.11.26.wp448.disaster.risk.management.national.pdf.

180 United Nations, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, A/CONF.206/6 (Jan. 2005), Section III (B), http://www.refworld.org/docid/42b98a704.html, UN HFA priorities for action. For assessments of how countries are performing in these areas, see UNISDR, "Annex 3: Progress in Implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action" in Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2013: From Shared Risk to Shared Value: The Business Case for Disaster Risk Reduction (Geneva: 2013); UNISDR, Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action: Summary of Reports 2007-2013 (Geneva, ISDR, 2013), http://www.preventionweb.net/files/32916_implementationofthehyogoframeworkfo.pdf; PreventionWeb, "HFA National Progress Reports," http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/progress/reports/?pid:223&pil:1.

181 Oxfam, The Power of People Against Poverty: Oxfam Strategic Plan, 2013-2019 (Oxford: Oxfam, 2013), https://www.oxfam.org/en/countries/oxfam-strategic-plan-2013-2019-power-people-against-poverty.

182 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 4.

183 Calculated from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute military expenditure database, http://portal.sipri.org/publications/ pages/expenditures/splash-expenditures.

184 Daniel Gorevan, "A Fairer Deal for Syrians: International Commitments Needed To Arrest the Deepening Crisis in Syria and the Region," Oxfam Briefing Paper 190 (Oxford: Oxfam, 2014). France, which ruled Syria under a League of Nations mandate from 1923 to 1943 and has participated in air strikes against the Islamic State, provided just 33 percent of its fair share; Australia, another anti-Islamic State coalition member, provided 27 percent; and Poland, also in the coalition, offered only 13 percent. Russia—a key diplomatic supporter of the Syrian government—gave a mere 1 percent. See Ashley Frantz, "Who's Doing What in the Coalition Battle Against ISIS," CNN, 9 October 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/09/world/meast/isis-coalition-nations/; Helene Cooper, "Obama Enlists 9 Allies to Help in the Battle Against ISIS," New York Times, 5 September 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/middleeast/us-and-allies-form-coalition-against-isis.html?_r=0.

185 Clapp, Hunger in the Balance.

186 Kellett and Caravani, Financing Disaster Risk Reduction, 7-8.

187 See http://www.corehumanitarianstandard.org/. Key elements of the standard include: communities and people affected by crisis receive appropriate and relevant assistance; humanitarian response is effective and timely; it strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects; it is based on communication, participation, and feedback; complaints are welcomed and addressed; humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary; humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve; staff are supported to do their job effectively, and are treated fairly and equitably; and resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose.

188 See, e.g., Grünewald and Binder, Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake.

189 James Tobin, "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform," Eastern Economic Journal 4 (1978): 153-59; Mahbub ul Haq, Inge Kaul, and Isabelle Grunberg, ed., The Tobin Tax: Coping with Financial Volatility (New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1996).

190 See http://robinhoodtax.org.uk/how-it-works for details.

191 Christian Aid has called for donors, UN agencies, and INGOs to provide a minimum of 15 percent of their humanitarian funding directly to local and national NGOs. Katherine Nightingale, Making the World Humanitarian Summit Worth the Climb (London: Christian Aid, 2014), 8.

192 According to the CAFOD survey of NNGOs, longer-term funding was the biggest change international actors could make to improve NNGO access to humanitarian funding. See Poole, Funding, 16.

193 The RAPID Fund in Pakistan, managed by Concern Worldwide, was set up to fill a gap left by the Pakistan ERF in terms of quick and flexible disbursements. It prioritizes funding LNGOs and NNGOs; in 2013, 78 percent of grants went to local and national NGOs, compared to 34 percent from the ERF. See ibid., 34.

194 Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014, 66; Poole, Funding, 48. In South Sudan, the funds include the South Sudan Rehabilitation Fund, the CHF and ERF, and a multi-donors trust fund.

195 Nightingale, Making the World Humanitarian Summit Worth the Climb, 8 (recommending that donors support an independent multi-donor NGO-led global response fund along the lines of the Start Fund model, and that the UN pooled funds become more flexible, learning lessons from the ERF and CHF in Somalia and the DRC).

196 John Cosgrave, Riccardo Polastro, and Willem van Eekelen, Evaluation of the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) Pilot (London: CBHA, 2012), www.alnap.org/pool/files/1448.pdf.

197 http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/the-cbha-early-response-fund-erf-3892.html.

198 For analysis of partnerships and models of coordination between international and local actors in humanitarian action, see generally Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, Missed Opportunities; Ramalingam and Mitchell, "Responding to Changing Needs"; Saavedra and Knox-Clarke, Working together in the field for effective humanitarian response; Howe, Stites, and Chudacoff, Breaking the Hourglass.

199 See, for example, the findings of the Learning Agenda on Local Capacity Development, a research effort designed to inform USAID about how to build more effective partnerships with local organizations: http://www.developmentiscapacity.org.

200 Scoping interviews: Peter Walker; Rick James, International NGO Training and Research Centre (March 2014). The Feinstein International Centre at Tufts University has recently produced research largely focused on remote management but containing valuable findings about capacity strengthening in humanitarian contexts more generally. See Howe, Stites, and Chudacoff, Breaking the Hourglass.

201 There were also fewer deaths from flooding over time, even when flood intensity increased: Looking at deaths from floods and measuring the severity based on the percentage of land that was flooded, 2,379 people died in a 1988 flood in which 60 percent of the land was flooded, compared with 1,050 deaths in a 1998 flood in which 70 percent of the land was flooded. For more detail on the Bangladesh case, see Government of Bangladesh, National Plan for Disaster Management 2010-2015 (Dhaka: Disaster Management Bureau, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, 2010), http://www.dmb.gov.bd/reports/npdm_final.pdf; Ubydul Haque, et al., "Reduced Death Rates from Cyclones in Bangladesh: What More Needs To Be Done?" Bulletin of the World Health Organization 90 (2012): 150-156; Golam M. Mathbor, "Enhancement of Community Preparedness for Natural Disasters: The Role of Social Work in Building Social Capital for Sustainable Disaster Relief and Management," International Social Work 50 (2007): 357-369; Bishawjit Mallick and Joachim Vogt, "Social Supremacy and Its Role in Local Level Disaster Mitigation Planning in Bangladesh," Disaster Prevention and Management 20 (2011): 543-556. We also obtained insights from scoping interviews with Gareth Price-Jones, Oxfam, and Nurul Islam, Paul Dorosh, and Shahidur Rashid, International Food Policy Research Institute (April 2014).

202 Information provided by Oxfam America Humanitarian Response Department and Oxfam El Salvador Office..

203 Fernando Almansa, Track Record on Mozambique Enhancing Humanitarian Local Capacities and Oxfam Novib's Role, internal document, May 2014.

204 The figure represents the percentage of total humanitarian spending considered "direct funding" to local actors (civil society and state entities in crisis-affected countries). The data represent expenditure information as reported by the 10 Oxfam affiliates that engage in humanitarian work: Oxfam America, Oxfam Australia, Oxfam-in-Belgium, Oxfam Canada, Oxfam Great Britain, Oxfam Hong Kong, Oxfam India, Oxfam Intermón (Spain), Oxfam Italy, and Oxfam Novib (the Netherlands). The time period includes Fiscal Years 2013, 2014, and 2015. Note that the figure is estimated since results for Fiscal Year 2015 are preliminary.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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